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 ABSTRACT 
The railway transportation system is fundamental in sustaining the economic activities of a 
country, by providing a safe, reliable and relatively affordable means of transporting people and 
goods; hence, the need to ensure its ongoing reliability is of paramount importance. The principle 
and applications of rail reliability have been reviewed, and reliability improvement in rail 
infrastructure has been investigated using failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA).   
Reliability improvement is a continuous process that is geared to meeting dynamic changes in 
operation and stakeholders’ expectations. Recently, growth has occurred in the amount of rail 
transport traffic utilisation undertaken, together with the degradation of the infrastructure 
involved. Such deterioration has amplified the operating risks, leading to an inadequacy in rail 
track maintenance and inspection that should have kept abreast with the changes. The result has 
been increased rail failures, and subsequent derailments. 
A case study of the Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (PRASA) Metrorail maintenance 
policy was reviewed to evaluate its maintenance strategy and identifying the potential critical 
failure modes, so as to be able to recommend improvement of its reliability, and, thus, its 
availability. On the basis of the case study of PRASA Metrorail maintenance strategy and its 
performance, it is recommended that PRASA Metrorail change its maintenance policy through 
employing a cluster maintenance strategy for each depot.  
Keywords: reliability improvement, railway infrastructure, maintenance management, FMEA, 
rail track failures. 
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OPSOMMING 
Die spoorwegvervoerstelsel is fundamenteel om die ekonomiese bedrywighede van ’n land te 
ondersteun deur die voorsiening van ’n veilige, betroubare en betreklik bekostigbare manier om 
mense en goedere te vervoer. Dus is dit van die allergrootste belang om die voortgesette 
betroubaarheid daarvan te verseker. Die beginsels en toepassings van spoorbetroubaarheid is 
hersien en die betroubaarheidsverbetering van spoorinfrastruktuur met behulp van foutmodus-en-
effekontleding (“FMEA”) ondersoek.   
Betroubaarheidsverbetering is ’n voortdurende proses om tred te hou met dinamiese 
bedryfsveranderinge sowel as verskuiwings in belanghebbendes se verwagtinge. Die hoeveelheid 
spoorvervoerverkeer het onlangs beduidend toegeneem, terwyl die betrokke infrastruktuur 
agteruitgegaan het. Dié agteruitgang het die bedryfsrisiko’s verhoog, en lei tot ontoereikende 
spoorweginstandhouding en -inspeksie, wat veronderstel was om met die veranderinge tred te 
gehou het. Dit gee aanleiding tot ’n toename in spoorwegfoute en gevolglike ontsporing. 
’n Gevallestudie is van die instandhoudingsbeleid van die Passasierspooragentskap van Suid-
Afrika (PRASA) Metrorail onderneem om dié organisasie se instandhoudingstrategie te 
beoordeel en die moontlike kritieke foutmodusse te bepaal. Die doel hiermee was om 
verbeteringe in stelselbetroubaarheid en dus ook stelselbeskikbaarheid voor te stel. Op grond van 
die gevallestudie van die PRASA Metrorail-instandhoudingstrategie en -prestasie, word daar 
aanbeveel dat PRASA Metrorail sy instandhoudingsbeleid verander deur ’n 
klusterinstandhoudingsplan vir elke depot in werking te stel.  
Trefwoorde: betroubaarheidsverbetering, spoorweginfrastruktuur, instandhoudingsbestuur, 
FMEA, spoorwegfoute 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
V 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
I wish to extend my appreciation to my supervisors Prof C.J. Fourie and Prof P.J. Vlok for their 
extensive invaluable guidance and support during my research. 
My profound gratitude goes to Willem Opperman, Lawrence Mthommbeni, Khumbulani 
Khumalo, Daan van Zyl, and Mackson Skomolo for giving me the opportunity to peruse their 
maintenance record. 
I want to express my profound gratitude to Pieter Conradie for his cordial reception, guidance 
and support, which were deeply appreciated. I also want to thank my wonderful family, friends, 
including Sandra Nathan, for their support and encouragement. 
Finally, I am grateful to God for the ability, empowerment and grace granted me to pursue this 
noble study. 
“Buy the truth, and sell it not; also wisdom, and instruction, and understanding.” 
-Proverbs 23:23- 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
VI 
TABLE	OF	CONTENTS	
DECLARATION.......................................................................................................................... II 
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................. III 
OPSOMMING............................................................................................................................. IV 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ........................................................................................................... V 
LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................................................... XI 
LIST OF TABLES .................................................................................................................... XII 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................. XIII 
CHAPTER ONE ........................................................................................................................... 1 
1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 1
1.1  Background ................................................................................................................. 1 
1.2  Problem Statement and Motivation ............................................................................ 3 
1.3  Research Objectives .................................................................................................... 4 
1.4  Scope Of Study ........................................................................................................... 4 
1.5  Research Methodology ............................................................................................... 4 
1.6  Thesis Outline ............................................................................................................. 5 
CHAPTER TWO .......................................................................................................................... 7 
2. Key Reliability Concepts .................................................................................................... 7
2.1  Reliability Availability Maintainability & Safety (RAMS) ........................................ 8 
2.2  Reliability Centred Maintenance (RCM) .................................................................... 9 
2.3  Performance Measures ................................................................................................ 9 
2.4  Reliability Improvement ........................................................................................... 11 
2.5  Benchmarking ........................................................................................................... 12 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
VII 
2.6  Chapter Summary ..................................................................................................... 14 
CHAPTER THREE .................................................................................................................... 15 
3. Reliability, Availability, Maintainability, & Safety (RAMS) ........................................... 15
3.1  Reliability Statistical Models .................................................................................... 23 
3.1.1  Weibull Distribution ................................................................................................. 25 
3.1.2  Exponential Distribution ........................................................................................... 25 
3.1.3  Non-homogenous POISSON PROCESS (NHPP) Model ........................................ 25 
3.2  Factors That Influence RAMS in Railway Infrastructure ......................................... 26 
3.3  RAMS Analysis of Rail Track .................................................................................. 28 
3.4  Chapter Summary ..................................................................................................... 29 
CHAPTER FOUR ....................................................................................................................... 30 
4. Reliability-Centred Maintenance (RCM) ......................................................................... 30
4.1  Failure ....................................................................................................................... 32 
4.2  RCM Maintenance Strategies ................................................................................... 33 
4.2.1  Run-to-Failure (RTF) ................................................................................................ 33 
4.2.2  Preventive Maintenance (PM) .................................................................................. 34 
4.2.3  Predictive Maintenance ............................................................................................. 35 
4.2.4  Design Modification ................................................................................................. 36 
4.3  Objectives of RCM ................................................................................................... 36 
4.4  Principles of RCM .................................................................................................... 37 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
VIII 
4.5  RCM Analysis ........................................................................................................... 39 
4.5.1  RCM in Railway Infrastructure ................................................................................ 39 
4.5.2  Benefits of RCM in Maintaining Railway Infrastructure ......................................... 39 
4.6  Actions in RCM Process Implementation, in Terms of Railway Infrastructure ....... 40 
4.7  Chapter summary ...................................................................................................... 41 
CHAPTER FIVE ........................................................................................................................ 42 
5. Railway Track Failures ..................................................................................................... 42
5.1  Railway Track Failure Classification ........................................................................ 43 
5.2  Rail Failure................................................................................................................ 43 
5.2.1  Defects in rail ends.................................................................................................... 46 
5.2.2  Defects away from rail ends ..................................................................................... 46 
5.2.3  Defects caused by rail damage .................................................................................. 53 
5.2.4  Weld and resurfacing defects .................................................................................... 53 
5.2.5  Rail wear ................................................................................................................... 53 
5.2.6  Sleeper failure ........................................................................................................... 54 
5.2.6.1  Steel sleepers ......................................................................................................... 54 
5.2.6.2  Timber sleepers ..................................................................................................... 54 
5.2.6.3  Concrete Sleepers.................................................................................................. 55 
5.2.7  Ballast Failure and Sub-ballast ................................................................................. 56 
5.2.8  Bridges and Tunnels ................................................................................................. 56 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
IX 
5.3  Rail Track Failure Analysis ...................................................................................... 56 
5.3.1  Failure prediction ...................................................................................................... 60 
5.4  Global Rail Track Failures Data ............................................................................... 64 
5.5  Chapter Summary ..................................................................................................... 67 
CHAPTER SIX ........................................................................................................................... 68 
6. Reliability Improvement ................................................................................................... 68
6.1  Reliability Improvement through Design Modification ........................................... 70 
6.2  Reliability Improvement by Means of Maintenance Improvement .......................... 72 
6.2.1  Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) ............................................................ 74 
6.2.2  Purpose of an FMEA/FMECA study ........................................................................ 75 
6.2.3  Principles of FMEA/FMECA ................................................................................... 75 
6.3  PRASA Maintenance Strategy .................................................................................. 77 
6.4  Cluster Maintenance Strategy ................................................................................... 82 
6.5  Chapter Summary ..................................................................................................... 82 
CHAPTER SEVEN ..................................................................................................................... 83 
7. Case Study PRASA Metrorail .......................................................................................... 83
7.1  Failure Analysis - PARETO ..................................................................................... 83 
7.1.1  FMEA Case Study .................................................................................................... 89 
7.1.2  FMEA Framework Case Study ................................................................................. 95 
7.2  Causes of Metrorail Track Unreliability ................................................................... 99 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
X 
7.3  Chapter Summary ................................................................................................... 100 
CHAPTER EIGHT ................................................................................................................... 101 
8. Conclusions and Recommendations ............................................................................... 101
8.1  Conclusion and Contributions................................................................................. 101 
8.2  Recommendations and Further Work ..................................................................... 103 
8.3  Recommendations ................................................................................................... 103 
8.4  Future Work ............................................................................................................ 104 
REFERENCES .......................................................................................................................... 105 
APPENDIX A ............................................................................................................................ 111 
South African Train Commuter Service ................................................................................. 111 
APPENDIX B ............................................................................................................................ 116 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
XI 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 2-1: Network and User Perspective of Reliability (OECD, 2010). ................................... 10 
Figure 2-2: Benchmarking Cycle (Adeney et al., 2003). .............................................................. 13 
Figure 3-1: Dependability Relationships (IEC 60300:3-3, 2004). ................................................ 16 
Figure 3-2: Impact of the Reliability Implication on LCC (Dhudsia, 1992). ............................... 18 
Figure 3-3: Reliability Bathtub Curve (Wilkins, 2002). ............................................................... 19 
Figure 3-4: Factors Influencing Railway RAMS (BS EN 50126-1, 1999). .................................. 27 
Figure 4-1: Overview of the RCM Process (BS EN 60300-3-11:2009). ...................................... 31 
Figure 4-2: P-F Curve (NASA, 2008). .......................................................................................... 32 
Figure 5-1: Codification of Rail Defects, (Adapted from UIC 712, 2002). .................................. 45 
Figure 5-2: Defects in the rail ends (SPOORNET, 2000). ............................................................ 46 
Figure 5-3: Tache Ovale (Kumar, 2006). ...................................................................................... 47 
Figure 5-4: Horizontal Cracking Defects (SPOORNET, 2000). .................................................. 48 
Figure 5-5: Short-pitch Rail Corrugation (Oostermeijer, 2006). .................................................. 48 
Figure 5-6: Rail Corrugation (Nielsen & Torstensson, 2010). ..................................................... 49 
Figure 5-7: Lateral Wear (Sadeghi & Akbari, 2006). ................................................................... 50 
Figure 5-8: Running Surface Defect (ARTC, 2006). .................................................................... 51 
Figure 5-9: Gauge-corner Shelling (Wilson et al., 2011). ............................................................ 52 
Figure 5-10: Head Check Defects (R06C0104, 2006). ................................................................. 52 
Figure 5-11: Timber Sleeper Failure (Hassankiadeh, 2011). ........................................................ 55 
Figure 5-12: Cumulated Rail Break versus Accumulated MGT .................................................. 61 
Figure 5-13: Weibull Plot and Linear Regression. ....................................................................... 62 
Figure 6-1: Cause and Effect of Rail Unreliability. ...................................................................... 70 
Figure 6-2: Track maintenance Chain of Events. ......................................................................... 77 
Figure 7-1: Gauteng South Perway Number of Events. ............................................................... 84 
Figure 7-2: Gauteng South Total Response Time Perway. ........................................................... 85 
 Figure 7-3: Gauteng South Total Outage Time Perway. ............................................................. 86 
Figure 7-4: Gauteng South Failure Modes Distribution Perway 2012-2013. ............................... 87 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
XII 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 3-1: Relationship between Availability & Reliability. ....................................................... 20 
Table 3-2: Reliability Statistical Models. ..................................................................................... 24 
Table 3-3: RAM Process and Tools (Guthrie et al., 1990). .......................................................... 28 
Table 5-1: Causes of Defective Rails (Sawley & Reiff, 2000). .................................................... 65 
Table 5-2: Broken Rails (Sawley & Reiff, 2000). ........................................................................ 66 
Table 5-3: Broken Rail Risk Guideline (Zarembski & Palese, 2006). ......................................... 66 
Table 6-1: On-Track Maintenance. ............................................................................................... 78 
Table 6-2: Scheduled Maintenance Activities (PRASA, 2013). ................................................... 80 
Table 6-3: Corrective Maintenance (PRASA, 2013). ................................................................... 80 
Table 7-1: PRASA/Metrorail Capital Intervention Programme – Gauteng South. ...................... 88 
Table 7-2: FMEA Railway Track. ................................................................................................ 91 
Table 7-3: FMEA Occurrence Evaluation (Adapted from Sameni, M.K., (2012)). ..................... 95 
Table 7-4: FMEA Severity Evaluation (Adapted from Sameni, M.K., (2012)). .......................... 96 
Table 7-5: Detection Evaluation (Adapted from Sameni, M.K., (2012)). .................................... 96 
Table 7-6: Risk Priority Numbers. ................................................................................................ 97 
Table 7-7: Risk Assessment Value ............................................................................................... 98 
Table 7-8: Direct Cost of Critical Track Components (PRASA, 2013). ...................................... 99 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
XIII 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
BS British Standard
CBM Condition-Based Maintenance 
CDF Cumulative Distribution Function 
CM Corrective Maintenance 
CTC Centralised Traffic Control 
EMPAC Enterprise Maintenance Planning and Control  
EN European Standard
FMEA Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 
FMECA Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis 
FTA Fault Tree Analysis 
KPI Key Performance Indicator 
LCC Life Cycle Cost 
MAD Mean Absolute Deviation 
MDBF Mean Distance between Failures 
MDT Mean Downtime 
MGT Million Gross Tonnes 
MLD Mean Logistic Delay 
MPH Miles per Hour 
MRT Mean Repair Time 
MTBF Mean Time between Failures 
MTBM Mean Time between Maintenance 
MTTF Mean Time to Failure 
MTTR Mean Time to Repair 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NHPP Non-Homogeneous Poisson Process 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-Operation And Development 
OEE Overall Equipment Effectiveness 
PA Public Address
PDF Probability Distribution Function 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
XIV 
PERWAY Permanent Way 
PM Preventive Maintenance 
PPIAF Public–Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility 
PRASA Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa 
RAM Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability 
RAMS reliability, availability, maintainability, and safety 
RCF rolling contact fatigue 
RCM reliability-centred maintenance 
RPN risk probability number 
RSR Rail Safety Regulator 
RTF run-to-failure 
SLA service level agreement 
TFR Transnet Freight Rail 
UIC  Union Internationale des Chemins de fer (International Union of Railways) 
US United States
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
1 
CHAPTER ONE 
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND 
The railway transportation system plays a vital role in sustaining the economic activities of a 
country by providing a safe, reliable, and relatively affordable means of transporting both people 
and goods. Rail transport in South Africa is a major means of transportation, transporting about 
2.4 million passengers per day (PRASA, 2011). 
As railway transport system operations and customers’ expectations have evolved over the last 
several decades, railway service operators have been finding ways of improving their operations, 
so as to ensure the maintenance of a safe and reliable railway transport system at a relatively low 
cost, and within the terms of the service level agreement (SLA). At the same time, rail transport, 
especially in South Africa, has been experiencing challenges regarding its operation, especially 
in terms of the reliability of its aged infrastructure, and the increased utilisation of its physical 
assets (Conradie, 2012). The reliability of railway infrastructure is fundamental for ensuring the 
efficient and effective operation of rail transport.  
The reliability and maintenance of the railway system infrastructure has been a subject of 
research by several scholars (Åhrén & Parida, 2008; Inazu, 2003; Marco et al., 2012; PPIAF, 
2011; RAIL, 2002). Most studies have tended to utilise performance measurement to evaluate 
the reliability of the railway system. Such models as that of life cycle cost (LCC) have been used 
for making maintenance decisions, and for assessing conditions of reliability, availability, 
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maintainability, and safety (RAMS). Additional models include the optimum maintenance 
strategy and failure mode effects and criticality analysis (FMECA), among many others. 
Railway infrastructure design modification, and the change management of its system, is a 
challenging process that requires ongoing attention after the initial design and installation, 
because most of the infrastructure concerned, such as rail track, is designed for a lifetime of 
about 30 - 60 years (Michas (2012) and Tranco, (2013)). The lifetime involved depends on the 
environment and on the usage concerned, even though a maintenance strategy is used to extend 
some of the physical assets’ lifespan. A variety of strategies are used in many railway system for 
the maintenance of the different systems involved, including those that are regulated by 
government standard, as well as those that require preventive and condition-based maintenance 
(CBM). However, due to the complexity of railway system dependability, no single global 
method, or standard of maintenance management system, is best suited for all railway transport 
systems. This is because of the different operating conditions, the varied skills levels required, 
and the prevailing environment, as such a maintenance strategy has to be developed on the basis 
of the existing circumstances.  
The railway infrastructure consists of such components as tracks (railway lines), bridges and 
platforms, signalling infrastructure (robots, points machines, and relay rooms), 
telecommunications systems (surveillance cameras, public address [PA] systems, and centralised 
traffic control [CTC]), and electrical systems (cables, power lines, and gantries) (Espling, 2007). 
These components are maintained according to diverse maintenance strategies that have been 
developed over the years. Due to their integrated reliance on each other, the reliability of a 
subsystem is critical to the total reliability of the overall railway transport system. 
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1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT AND MOTIVATION 
Railway transport operation is both capital and labour-intensive; therefore, railway managers are 
continuously researching maintenance management improvement techniques, while they are 
striving to provide high-quality service. In this way, they make an effort to keep the operation 
competitive, despite the rising cost of maintenance, and the possibility of a deteriorating 
infrastructure (ORR, 2010). It has, accordingly, become imperative to evaluate the current 
maintenance strategy system with regard to reliability, safety, and the key performance indicators 
(KPIs) that are used to measure the performance of the infrastructure system that supports the 
service needs.  
With performance measurements being used to appraise the reliability of a system, a consistent 
and objective measuring system is required. Such performance measurement uses a 
benchmarking system to evaluate the different scenarios that can affect the reliability of the 
railway system. The problem with the former system is that railway infrastructure systems are 
impacted by variables that are specific to a location, such as the operating environment, the 
traffic volume, and usage, among others (Patra, 2009).  
The annual expenditure on the railway maintenance of Japan JR East, which operates 12 000 
trains per day, is 29% of its annual operating expenditure (Inazu, 2003). Such expenditure forms 
part of a global trend in the upkeep of railway systems throughout the world, with similar 
investment having taken place in the South African passenger railway system, in regards to its 
extended capacity in terms of its infrastructure and rolling stock (PRASA, 2012). However, 
together with the massive sums that are required to be spent in terms of capital investment, it is 
important to find ways of optimising the current maintenance strategy, and of using the historical 
data, and the relevant information, to improve the reliability of the future railway infrastructure. 
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The cost of delays, of customer dissatisfaction, of inefficient service, of lost revenue, and of lost 
time due to railway infrastructure failures cannot be overemphasised. An example of a case study 
of the Metrorail South Africa infrastructure highlights the fact that weaknesses in the 
infrastructure contribute to 2% of the cancellations and 21% of the delays experienced in the 
Western Cape rail system (Conradie, 2012). The aging of most South African railway 
infrastructure assets beyond their anticipated economic lifetime has resulted in significantly high 
costs in terms of required refurbishment and maintenance (PRASA, 2011). See APPENDIX A 
for details of the capacity of the South African train commuter service. 
1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
The main objectives of this thesis are to: 
a) Investigate the improvement of railway infrastructure reliability by highlighting areas of
risk and non-conformity.
b) To get an improved categorization of the most critical failure modes in railway track
infrastructure.
1.4 SCOPE OF STUDY 
The scope of the current study is limited to improvement in the railway infrastructure, with an 
emphasis on railway track. The interaction of subsystems, as it affects the reliability of the whole 
railway transport system, was not evaluated. 
1.5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The study approach is based on applied research i.e. both quantitative and qualitative methods to 
obtain improved categorization of the most critical failure modes in railway track infrastructure. 
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The information was gathered from literature study, railway depot visitation, discussions and 
consultation with reliability engineers from Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (PRASA). 
The theoretical frame work for the research was based on Reliability centred maintenance 
(RCM) functional failure analysis procedure: 
 collect and analyse field data
 perform functional partitioning – by selecting region to be analysed
 identify functions, functional failures, failures mode, effects and criticality analysis
 evaluate failure consequence using risk priority numbers
 recommend maintenance strategy
1.6 THESIS OUTLINE 
The layout of this thesis is structured into seven chapters and three appendices. The sequence is 
aligned to the research objectives and the research design. 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Chapter 1 is the introductory section which provides the description of the research background, 
research problem, research objectives and lastly the thesis layout. 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Chapter 2 provides literature review of key concepts in reliability methods, performance 
measures, reliability improvement and benchmarking. The literature review is focused on the 
overview of major components that constitute reliability improvement methods and 
fundamentals of railway track reliability in railway infrastructure. 
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Chapter 3: Reliability Availability Maintainability & Safety (RAMS) 
Chapter 3 describes reliability improvement methodologies of reliability availability and 
maintainability (RAM) and discusses the applicability of these strategies in railway track 
reliability. The role of RAMS and factors affecting RAMS as a strategic planning tool for 
railway track were discussed. 
Chapter 4: Reliability Centred Maintenance (RCM) 
Reliability centred maintenance (RCM) program and principles are elaborated. These strategies 
are used by maintenance managers to improve system reliabilities. 
Chapter 5: Railway Track Failures 
Chapter 5 provides failure statistics of railway track and classification. The section also 
evaluated rail track failures. 
Chapter 6: Reliability Improvement 
Chapter 6 describes the concept of reliability improvement and introduces principle, and purpose 
of FMEA. 
 Chapter 7: Reliability Improvement 
Chapter 7 describes the frame work of reliability improvement and case study of PRASA 
Metrorail failures modes and effects.  
Chapter 8: Conclusion and Recommendation 
Chapter 8 provides a summary and discussion of this research objective, its applicability and 
closed with concluding remarks and recommendations for further study. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
2. KEY RELIABILITY CONCEPTS
Reliability is the probability that an item will perform its intended function for a designated 
period of time without failure, under specified conditions (Singpurwalla, 2013). In terms of such 
a perspective, unreliability in public transport can be defined as the shortcomings that take place 
in a transport system, in which the actual departure and arrival times deviate from those that are 
given on the official timetable (Rietveld, Bruinsma & Van Vuuren, 2001). Reliability in a 
railway system is often differently described by users, in comparison to how it is described by 
network operators. The rail user/passenger tends to see such reliability in terms of the transport 
system operating in line with set schedules that are not subject to delay. In contrast, for the 
network operator, reliability can be defined in several different ways, depending on the SLA, and 
on the key performance index, involved (OECD, 2010). Reliability in railway systems requires 
benchmarking according to the same standards of measurement. Therefore, the distance travelled 
and the axle loads need to be taken into consideration before the performance of a particular 
railway system can be evaluated. 
The reliability of a system can be improved by avoiding failure. Such avoidance of failure can be 
achieved by improving the availability, the components design, and the maintenance of the 
individual components concerned. Understanding the failure mechanism, and identifying the 
critical components and the subsystems involved, would also assist in improving the reliability of 
the system, as doing so would contribute towards the development of a periodical maintenance 
and inspection strategy (Barabady, 2005). Reliability can also be improved through the adoption, 
and through the implementation, of effective policies early on in the design stage of railway 
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system components. The policies concerned relate to such items as the product development 
cycle, RAMS, reliability modelling, and others. 
2.1 RELIABILITY AVAILABILITY MAINTAINABILITY & SAFETY (RAMS) 
The railway infrastructure consists of several fixed physical assets that support the transportation 
of passengers and freight. Railway infrastructure systems like track, signal and train control, and 
electrification are maintained according to such diverse maintenance strategies as RAMS, with 
the techniques concerned being used to forecast system failures that become apparent from the 
analysis of operational field data. The subsequent paragraphs contain a discussion and review of 
reliability and rail maintenance strategies.  
Simoes’ (2008) dissertation included a RAMS analysis of railway track infrastructure using the 
RAMS technique for forecasting failure, as well as their associated cost. In Arjen and Egbert’s 
(2001) study, which was aimed at improving the performance of rail during the design phase of 
railway construction, the two authors emphasised the importance of RAMS in the phase 
concerned. 
Patra (2009) conducted a study of RAMS and LCC, in which the researcher demonstrated the 
application of RAMS in railway maintenance planning. In the same study, he also presented 
methods and models for estimating RAMS targets, based on the service quality requirements of 
the railway infrastructure. However, the study omitted to cover the interaction effects of the 
maintenance decision made on the different subsystems of railway infrastructure.  
Railway availability is one of the performance measures in terms of which railway stakeholders 
evaluate the reliability of a railway system. Patra et al.’s (2010) paper on the availability targets 
of a rail infrastructure system was based on capacity and punctuality requirements. The data 
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obtained for their study was used to develop a model using Monte Carlo simulation and Petri-
Nets to establish the relationship of availability, capacity, and punctuality, and how the 
relationship concerned affects the infrastructure availability, in terms of train delays and 
capacity. 
The RAMS concept and its applicability in railway infrastructure would be further discussed in 
CHAPTER THREE. 
2.2 RELIABILITY CENTRED MAINTENANCE (RCM) 
Reliability-centred maintenance (RCM) is another method that is used by maintenance managers 
in public and private organisations to improve OEE, while controlling the life cycle and quality 
assurance involved (NASA, 2008). RCM principles and techniques have been used by the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to improve, and to manage, more than 
44 million square feet of facilities and the associated billions of US dollars of collateral 
equipment. This was achieved by using predictive testing and inspection, FMEA and many other 
improvement techniques.  
RCM is currently used extensively in developing maintenance strategies for railway tracks 
(RAIL, 2002). RCM concept and its applicability in railway infrastructure would be further 
discussed in CHAPTER FOUR. 
2.3 PERFORMANCE MEASURES 
Performance measures are used to motivate for improvement, and also to benchmark 
performance across similar systems. Performance measures in railway systems have traditionally 
been evaluated in terms of such metrics as mean time between failures (MTBF) and mean time to 
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repair (MTTR). Thomas and Uday (2004) undertook a study on the use of maintenance 
performance indicators on railway infrastructure, using Sweden Banverket as their case study. In 
their case study they identified four maintenance performance indicators within a hierarchical 
goal structure. In addition, they also concluded that a link-and-effect model is required to define 
critical strategic areas that must be supported by a number of performance indicators, so as to 
cover the whole spectrum of both the performance, and the outcomes from the maintenance 
process. 
Improving reliability on surface transport networks derived from the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2010) highlights the reliability perspective from the 
perspective of both the user and the network provider. The indices concerned, require aligning 
and integrating to obtain a unified benchmark that is acceptable to both parties. Figure 2-1shows 
the schema of integrating reliability from the perspective of both. 
Figure 2-1: Network and User Perspective of Reliability (OECD, 2010). 
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2.4 RELIABILITY IMPROVEMENT 
The reliability analysis and the evaluation of physical assets is usually performed during the 
design phase of the equipment, after the design and the commissioning have taken place, with 
reliability becoming part of the quality improvement process (Billinton & Allan, 1992). Hence, 
reliability is a continuous task that must be undertaken to ensure that a system continues to 
operate according to the appropriate design and operational requirements. Marco et al. (2012) 
undertook a study of reliability improvement, using a methodology consisting of a family-based 
approach aimed at achieving equipment reliability. The purpose of the study was to identify 
families of railway items that could be assigned the same reliability targets, as well as being used 
to build a taxonomy of the features of railway infrastructure systems. 
Blischke and Murthy (2003) assert that reliability is one of the most important considerations 
defining the quality of a product or system. The two researchers describe how reliability can be 
achieved by means of the exertion of design and quality assurance efforts, as well as by means of 
the choice of materials, production, proper maintenance, and other related decisions and 
activities. Accordingly, it can be seen that achieving the high reliability of a product, or of a 
system, is a combination of such interrelated and interdependent disciplines as engineering 
science, statistics, computer science, operational analysis, and management, among others. 
Famurewa (2012), in his dissertation, identified maintenance improvement as the basis for 
capacity enhancement in railway network. Such improvement can be achieved by introducing 
changes to the concept, the procedure, the techniques, the methods, the resources, and the level 
of maintenance. Rietveld et al. (2001) enumerated the attributes of reliability measures in 
railway systems as consisting of the following: 
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 The probability of punctuality of train arrival.
 The probability of an early departure.
 The mean difference between the expected arrival time and the scheduled arrival time.
 The mean delay of an arrival, given that one arrives late.
 The mean delay of an arrival, given that one arrives more than Χ minutes late.
 The standard deviation of arrival times.
 The adjusted standard deviation of arrival times (ignoring early arrivals).
Various other more complex measures were also enumerated to represent the seriousness of the 
unreliability involved. 
2.5 BENCHMARKING
Benchmarking is a method that is used to compare similar business process and performance 
metrics with best industry practices. Different benchmarking methodologies (Camp, 1989; 
NASA, 2008; OECD, 2000; PPIAF, 2011) exist. Camp (1989), one of the pioneers of 
benchmarking, described twelve stage guides for benchmarking a process or system. NASA 
(2008) also highlights benchmarking in its RCM guide, in terms of which KPIs are used to 
establish benchmarking methodologies.  
Benchmarking is used in the industry for the business improvement of such programmes as 
maintenance, overall equipment effectiveness (OEE), RCMs, and cost-effectiveness. 
Benchmarking in the railway industry is defined as: “the process of comparing performance of 
one entity (the subject railway) to the performance of other entities (the benchmark companies) 
to identify best practices and opportunities for improvement” (PPIAF, 2011). 
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Benchmarking is both a qualitative indicator, and a quantitative analysis, of industry best 
practice, in terms of which it compares the statistics of one Railway Company with those of 
another, using the same metrics indices. Figure 2-2 is a flow diagram showing the process 
undergone in the benchmarking cycle (Adeney et al., 2003). The flow diagram shows how 
benchmarking can be used to improve business process, quality of service, and effectiveness, as 
well as to encourage change management.  
Figure 2-2: Benchmarking Cycle (Adeney et al., 2003). 
The Public–Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF) (2011) describes how detailed 
railway benchmark indicators can be used to measure, and to improve, performance. 
Benchmarking in railway systems is, hence, important for achieving reliability improvement, 
because it provides the information that is required to show the shareholders the performance of 
their company, as compared to the performance of other railway industries, and to the source 
investment supplied by the government.  
Benchmarking is also used as a tool for charging fares relating to the regulation and monitoring 
of contractual performance (Adeney et al., 2003). Caution needs to be applied when 
benchmarking different railway industries, because the performance indicators are dependent on 
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such variables as climatic conditions, demographic structure, differences in culture, national 
administration, statistical definitions, and the location of the railway station (OECD, 2000). 
Therefore, benchmarking has to be done objectively, by comparing similar railways with closely 
similar characteristics and operating conditions. The PPIAF (2011) describes the characteristics 
involved as: 
 Size/capacity
 Traffic volume and type
 Traffic mix and journey types (e.g. passenger or freight)
 Traffic density
 Standardised technology level
Hence, benchmarking is useful in regulating costs, as well as in matters of trend development in 
the industry, best practice, and cost-effectiveness. 
2.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Chapter Two provides the context of the problem statement with the aim of introducing the 
several areas of interest which this study touches on.  A literature review of RAMS, RCM, 
reliability improvement and benchmarking was conducted and presented in this chapter. The 
literature review showed that research work is required to develop a frame work of railway track 
benchmarking and also a dynamic reliability improvement strategy. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
3. RELIABILITY, AVAILABILITY, MAINTAINABILITY, & SAFETY
(RAMS)
RAMS is one of the techniques that is used by maintenance managers to make effective 
maintenance decisions. Use of the technique helps to identify the different maintenance options 
that are required to ensure that the equipment operates within its design, safety, and service 
requirements. RAMS, in terms of the railway system, is used to define the level of confidence 
involved, so that the system(s) can guarantee a defined amount of rail traffic within a set time 
period.  
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Figure 3-1 shows the relationship of dependability and attributes during a system life cycle. 
Figure 3-1: Dependability Relationships (IEC 60300:3-3, 2004). 
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The flow diagram above shows that dependability is a function of a system’s reliability, 
availability, maintainability, and maintenance support. 
Reliability is defined by Gold Book IEEE STD 493, 2007 as the ability of a component or 
system to perform required functions under stated conditions for a stated period of time. 
Reliability is generally calculated using failure rate data λs(t) over a time interval (t1 → t2) by 
applying the following equations:  
Rୱሺtଵ → tଶሻ ൌ exp ቀെ׬ λୱሺtሻ୲మ୲భ dtቁ…………………...……….. (1) 
Reliability is traditionally quantified as MTBF for a repairable system, and as mean time to 
failure (MTTF) for a non-repairable system. The following equations hold true in this respect:  
MTBF ൌ ୘୭୲ୟ୪	୲୧୫ୣ୒୳୫ୠୣ୰	୭୤	୤ୟ୧୪୳୰ୣୱ………………….…………………… (2) 
MTTF ൌ ୘୭୲ୟ୪	୲୧୫ୣ୒୳୫ୠୣ୰	୭୤	୳୬୧୲ୱ	୳୬ୢୣ୰	୲ୣୱ୲……………………………….. (3) 
MTBF is not a true picture of system reliability, despite it being an average failure rate, as it does 
not give the picture of failure range within a specified period of time. As a result, the use of a 
probability computation is preferable. 
Dhudsia (1992) illustrates how a reliability programme can impact on the life cycle cost (LCC) 
of equipment. In Figure 3-2, it can be seen that a well-established reliability study can improve 
the total LCC of equipment, thus reducing the operational cost involved. This information is 
important during the design or procurement phase of equipment or a system.  
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Figure 3-2: Impact of the Reliability Implication on LCC (Dhudsia, 1992). 
Bagowsky (1961) defines reliability “as the probability of a device performing its purpose 
adequately for the period of time intended under the operating conditions encountered”. In terms 
of this definition, the different components of reliability can be grouped into the following 
clusters: 
 Probability of desired performance
 Period of use
 Operating conditions
The bathtub curve is used to describe failure rate versus the duration of the service life of 
equipment, using RAMS (Simões, 2008). Figure 3-3 below indicates the reliability bathtub 
curve. It is used as a graphic model to show the three key periods of system failure during the 
lifespan involved.  
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Figure 3-3: Reliability Bathtub Curve (Wilkins, 2002). 
Availability, as defined by IEC 60050-191, 2002 is the ability of a product to be in a state to 
perform a required function under given conditions at a given instant of time, or over a given 
time interval, assuming that the required external resources are provided. Availability is 
expressed as the following equations: 
A ൌ ୙୮୲୫ୣሺ୙୮୲୧୫ୣାୈ୭୵୬୲୧୫ୣሻ………………………………………… (4) 
A୧୬୦ୣ୰ୣ୬୲ ൌ ୑୘୆୊ሺ୑୘୆୊ା୑୘୘ୖሻ ……………….……………….……. (5) 
A୭୮ୣ୰ୟ୲୧୭୬ୟ୪ ൌ MTBM ሺMTBM ൅MDTሻ⁄  …………….………. (6) 
Where: 
MTBM: Mean Time between Maintenance 
MDT: Mean Down Time 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
20 
. 
Equation 5 is used to calculate the availability of a system’s inherent availability during a 
product design phase, whereas equation 6 is used to calculate the availability that is used in an 
operational environment, because the equation accounts for inadequacies in the plant set-up.  
Table 3-1 reflects the relationship between reliability, maintainability, and availability. From the 
table, an increase in maintainability can be seen to entail a decrease in the amount of time that it 
takes to perform maintenance actions, and, when the reliability is held constant, it can be seen 
that it does not directly imply a high availability. As the length of time for repairs increases, the 
availability of the system decreases. Therefore, a system with a low reliability could have a high 
availability if the amount of time required for repairs is short. 
Table 3-1: Relationship between Availability & Reliability.
 Reliability Maintainability Availability
Constant Decreases Decreases 
Constant Increases Increases
Increases Constant Increases 
Decreases Constant Decreases
Maintainability is defined by IEC 60050-191, 2002 as the probability that a given active 
maintenance action, for an item under given conditions of use, can be carried out within a stated 
time interval, when the maintenance is performed under stated conditions, and using stated 
procedures and resources. 
Maintainability characteristics are usually determined, or recommended, by original equipment 
manufacturers. The manufacturers concerned usually describe the maintenance procedures that 
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are required to be followed, and also determine the interval time for repair/service. 
Maintainability, which is traditionally measured by MTTR, is expressed mathematically as:  
Mሺ௧ሻ ൌ 1 െ exp	 ቀ ି୲୑୘୘ୖቁ ………………………...………….… (7) 
Mሺ୲ሻ ൌ 1 െ exp	ሺെμtሻ ………………………………………... (8) 
Where μ is the expected mean maintenance rate (constant for exponential distribution), and 
MTTR is the average of how fast the system is repaired. 
Example of PRASA application of MTTR; for a financial year the maintenance record shows 
that they were 217 failure events and 34 282 minutes of outage time. PRASA assumes that the 
failure rate (from historical failure events) is constant, hence exponential distributed. 
Therefore the MTTR; 
MTTR ൌ 	34282217 ൌ 158	minutes 
μሺrepair	rateሻ ൌ 1MTTR ൌ
1
158 ൌ 0.006
repairs
minute
Maintainability can then be calculated for 200 minutes using the repair rate: 
Mሺ200ሻ ൌ 1 െ	eିμ୲ ൌ 1 െ eିሺ଴.଴଴଺ሻሺଶ଴଴ሻ ൌ 0.699 
Hence there is 70% probability of meeting the maintenance goal at 200 minutes. 
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Maintenance management is the alignment of technical and administrative management (i.e. the 
systematic approach to planning, organising, monitoring, and costing) action plans aimed at 
ensuring system operation, upkeep, and restoration to the state where the system is able to 
perform its intended function once again.  Management is a continuous dynamic strategy that is 
employed to meet system, or operational, requirements. 
Maintenance strategies are continuous activities that are used to ensure that system components 
are systematically maintained by the most economical and technical means. Some of the 
strategies concerned are: 
 Preventive maintenance (PM)
 Predictive maintenance
 Opportunity maintenance
 Breakdown/unplanned maintenance
 Design out maintenance
The maintenance department in an organisation is responsible for ensuring optimum plant 
availability and maintenance resource utilisation. The following are some of the functions of a 
maintenance department: 
 Maintenance of installed physical assets
 Installation of new physical assets
 PM tasks of inspection of existing physical assets
 Condition monitoring task of monitoring faults and failures
 Modification of existing physical assets
 Management of inventory
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 Supervision of human resources and record keeping
Safety entails ensuring that all maintenance, operation, and design activities do not cause harm 
to people, to the environment, or to any other assets during their life cycle. Safety, which has 
become a key concern in any engineering activities, is used to measure the key performance of 
an operation; thus, it can impact on the reliability and availability of a system. Safety can be 
grouped into three categories: 
 Physical asset protection
 Personal protection
 Environment protection.
Failure mode, effect and criticality analysis (FMECA), which is supplementary to RAM analysis, 
is extensively used to achieve reliability and safety in railway infrastructure by identifying safety 
(both passenger and public) and reliability critical systems that affect rail travel availability. 
3.1 RELIABILITY STATISTICAL MODELS 
As RAM parameters are probabilistic, they are analysed using continuous and discrete random 
variables, and statistical distributions. In modelling the reliability of a system, a test is usually 
conducted on the components of the system, or on the basis of failure data that are obtained from 
the operational history concerned. James (2003) performed a safety and reliability analysis based 
on mathematical statistics, in terms of which railway infrastructures were analysed, using a 
stochastic model. Accordingly, the statistical functions involved can be seen to be important in 
terms of the reliability analysis of railway infrastructure systems. 
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Table 3-2 below illustrates the cumulative distribution function (CDF), the probability distribution function (PDF), and the failure rate 
of statistical models that are used in analysing component reliability. 
Table 3-2: Reliability Statistical Models.
Name Cumulative Distribution Function Probability Distribution Function Failure rate References 
Weibull ܨሺݔሻ ൌ ൝1 െ ݁ିቀ
௫ିఊ
ఈ ቁ
ഁ		ݔ ൒ ߛ
0	 		ݔ ൏ ߛ ݂
ሺݔሻ ൌ ൝
ߚ
ߙ ቀ
ݔ െ ߛ
ߙ ቁ
ఉ
0							 			ݔ ൏ ߛ
݁ିቀ௫ିఊఈ ቁ
ഁ
	ݔ ൒ ߛ ߣሺݐሻ ൌ ߚߙ ൬
1 െ ߛ
ߙ ൰
ఉିଵ Simoes’ 
(2008) 
Exponential ܨሺݔሻ ൌ ൜1 െ ݁ିఒ							ݔ ൒ 00 ݔ ൏ 0 ݂ሺݔሻ ൌ ൜
ߣ݁ିఒ௫										ݔ ൐ 0
0 ݔ ൑ 0
ߣሺݐሻ ൌ ߣ Simoes’ 
(2008) 
Log-linear 
(NHPP) 
- - ρଵሺtሻ ൌ expሺα଴ ൅ αଵtሻ Vlok (2014) 
Power Law 
(NHPP) 
- - ρଶሺtሻ ൌ λβtஒିଵ Vlok, (2014) 
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3.1.1 WEIBULL DISTRIBUTION 
The Weibull distribution is one of the most widely used distributions in reliability and 
maintainability analysis (Al-Fawzan, 2000). The distribution is used to model such items as 
material strength, and times-to-failure of electronic and mechanical components. It is 
characterised by a minimum value asymptotic distribution, which is useful in the analysis of 
lifetime data, where the failure time is dependent on the weakest link present. The Weibull 
distribution has three basic parameters (Chikrel-Mezouar, 2010), namely: 
 Shaping parameter
 Scaling parameter
 Location parameter
The Weibull can be used to express the wear-out, or the random failure, period of the bathtub 
curve. 
3.1.2 EXPONENTIAL DISTRIBUTION 
The exponential distribution is a continuous probability distribution that describes the time 
between events in terms of a Poisson process. This is due to its constant hazard rate, which 
results from combining failure rates into a single number. It is, therefore, widely used in 
predictions involving electronic equipment, and complex systems, with independent failure rates. 
3.1.3 NON-HOMOGENOUS POISSON PROCESS (NHPP) MODEL 
NHPP model can address trends, aging or reliability growth of repairable systems. The 
prerequisite of modelling NHPP is to check the presence of aging in the system (Vlok, 2014). 
This is carried out by trend analysis using the statistical historical data. 
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Railway track degrades due to tonnage accumulation on the track from train movement, hence 
degradation will continue to increase as the cumulative traffic and tonnage continues.  Railway 
track defects and failures are considered a repairable system (Simões, 2008 and Chattopadhyay 
et al. (2006)) hence it can be modelled as a stochastic point process using Non-homogeneous 
Poisson process (NHPP).  
3.2 FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE RAMS IN RAILWAY INFRASTRUCTURE 
The factors that influence RAMS in railway systems, which are shown in Figure 3-4 are grouped 
into three main categories of condition: system; operating; and maintenance. The conditions 
concerned interact to affect the overall railway system’s RAMS. 
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Figure 3-4: Factors Influencing Railway RAMS (BS EN 50126-1, 1999). 
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3.3 RAMS ANALYSIS OF RAIL TRACK 
The RAMS analysis of a railway track comprises several components, including: rails; switches; 
fasteners; sleepers; tie plates; rail anchors; ballast; and sub-grade. It also includes consideration 
of each of the following components’ failure impact on the reliability, the availability, the 
maintainability, and the safety of the total rail track system. To perform a RAMS analysis of a 
track, a good understanding of the failure modes, and of the available analysis tools, as described 
by the process framework of Guthrie, Farquharson, Bonnett and Bjoro (1990), is crucial. 
RAMS analysis of a railway track system is used to optimise the maintenance strategy of the 
system, and, thus, its reliability. The RAMS process of railway track uses the failure history of 
the system to extrapolate probabilities of future performance. Table 3-3, which lists the process 
tools that are used to perform a typical RAM study, refers to such models as the reliability block 
diagram, which can be used to integrate reliability and maintainability parameters (Patra, 2007).  
Table 3-3: RAM Process and Tools (Guthrie et al., 1990).
Management RAM programme plan RAM review process 
Modelling and analysis 
Block diagram analysis 
FMECA 
FTA 
Markov analysis 
Event-tree analysis 
Cause–consequence analysis 
Maintenance-engineering analysis 
Life-cycle cost analysis 
Sneak-circuit analysis 
Tolerance analysis 
Part-count analysis 
Growth analysis 
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Testing 
RAM test plan 
Test, analyse, and fix process (growth testing) 
Environmental stress screening 
Reliability qualification testing 
Production reliability acceptance testing 
Data collection and analysis 
Generic data development 
Failure reporting, analysis and corrective action 
system 
System design and logistics 
Redundancy and diversity 
Modularity and diagnostics 
Reliability vs. maintainability trade-off studies 
Part control programme 
RAM procurement specifications 
PM programme 
Corrective maintenance programme 
Spare-part programme 
3.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
RAMS was introduced as an analysis tool of a railway track system which can be used to 
optimise the maintenance strategy of the system, and, thus, its reliability. The RAMS process of 
railway track uses the failure history of the system to extrapolate probabilities of future 
performance. 
RAM analysis, is extensively used to achieve reliability and safety in railway infrastructure by 
identifying safety (both passenger and public) and reliability critical systems that affect rail 
travel availability and finally, the role of RAMS and factors affecting RAMS was discussed. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4. RELIABILITY-CENTRED MAINTENANCE (RCM)
Maintenance management strategies have been evolving, with one of the methodologies that 
have been gaining recognition being RCM. RCM is a continuous decision-making process for 
identifying the best-suited maintenance requirements, as well as management decisions and 
actions, for a system, in accordance with its LCC and safety. Such maintenance is also defined as 
“a method to identify and select failure management policies to efficiently achieve the required 
safety, availability and economy of operation” (BS EN 60300-3-11, 2009). The definition in 
BS EN 60300-3-11 encompasses the management of failures, as well as the safety and decision-
making process. The basic actions that are undertaken in an RCM programme, which are 
elaborated on in the subsequent paragraph, are as follows: 
 Initiation and planning
 Functional failure analysis
 Task selection
 Implementation
 Continuous improvement
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The tasks identified can be applied to any physical asset. The overview of the RCM is shown in 
Figure 4-1.  
Figure 4-1: Overview of the RCM Process (BS EN 60300-3-11:2009). 
The RCM methodology uses identified failure modes in the system to find their causes and 
occurrence, so that they can be eliminated.  
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4.1 FAILURE 
Understanding failure is critical in establishing an all-encompassing maintenance strategy. 
Figure 4-2 shows the importance of understanding system performance and failure at different 
system levels. The P-F curve shown in the graph provides a conceptual degradation detection 
process for maintenance managers. The graph illustrates the fact that, as a failure starts to 
manifest itself, the equipment deteriorates to the point at which the failure can be detected. 
However, if the failure is not detected, it then reaches the point of functional failure. The time in 
between the point of initial degradation and functional failure provides an opportunity for 
maintenance to be undertaken. The concept concerned is important in rail inspection, with 
defects increasingly becoming so difficult to detect that they tend to lead to rail failures and 
derailments. 
Figure 4-2: P-F Curve (NASA, 2008). 
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4.2 RCM MAINTENANCE STRATEGIES 
The following factors are used to determine the nature of the railway infrastructure maintenance 
inspections required:   
 Maximum train speed
 Traffic intensity
 Type of traffic
 Climate and environmental conditions
 Geological conditions
 Technical standard of the infrastructure components
 Built-in functional security
 Age and quality of the system
RCM facilitates maintenance management in terms of the type of maintenance strategy that 
should be implemented in respect of a physical asset. The maintenance strategies that are 
employed are: 
 Run–to–failure maintenance
 Preventive Maintenance
 Predictive maintenance
 Design modification
4.2.1 RUN-TO-FAILURE (RTF) 
RTF maintenance, which is also known as reactive maintenance, is a strategy/policy used by 
organisations to manage physical assets. It entails allowing the component, or part of equipment, 
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to fail without it affecting the safety of the total system. RTF maintenance is mostly applied to 
non-critical components, in terms of which the consequences of failure do not have a critical 
impact on production loss, safety, environmental impact, and failure cost. Consequently, RTF 
management is expected to have minimal LCC, as compared to preventive maintenance (PM) 
(IAEA-TECDOC-1590, 2007). 
The use of RTF, which is a corrective and reactive maintenance strategy, implies that sufficient 
planning with regard to spares and work orders is required to minimise production downtime.  
Corrective maintenance (CM) is grouped as either deferred or immediate maintenance 
(Anderson, 2002). Deferred maintenance is described as faults that do not impact on major 
equipment. The faults concerned are relatively small, and are grouped together to be carried out 
at a planned date. In contrast, immediate maintenance applies to emergency faults, in relation to 
which actions are carried out instantly. Even though RTF is a CM strategy, it is rarely used in 
railway infrastructure maintenance strategy. The costs that are associated with RTF maintenance 
management, which are relatively high, relate to: overtime labour costs; the high cost of spare 
parts; high machine downtime; inventory costs; and low production/system availability. 
4.2.2 PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE (PM) 
PM, which is a type of maintenance that is carried out before a breakdown occurs, includes such 
activities as inspection, detection, lubrication, and corrective actions, among others. The 
maintenance concerned is aimed at improving the reliability and the availability of a system, by 
means of reducing the degradation of a component, or by means of extending its useful life. The 
objective of PM is to minimise the probability of occurrence of failure. 
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PM uses the amount of time, or the number of hours of operation, to determine the maintenance 
frequency. Hence, it is scheduled on the basis of probability of failure distribution, or bathtub 
curve, in some instances. 
PM is classified as being either condition-based or predetermined. Condition-based PM includes 
the conducting of inspections, and the taking of measures, to mitigate problems relating to the 
equipment, with respect to the inspection carried out. Predetermined maintenance is used on the 
parts of equipment whose life cycles can be predicted, leading to a certain periodicity of actions 
(Anderson, 2002). In terms of the railway infrastructure, PM is carried out on railway track to 
bring the track circuit back to an acceptable condition. For instance, rail grinding is a planned 
PM measure that is used to restore the rail profile, and also to remove any surface damage that 
might have occurred since the previous PM checks (ORR, 2006). 
4.2.3 PREDICTIVE MAINTENANCE 
Predictive maintenance which is also known as Condition Based Maintenance (CBM), is the 
philosophy of monitoring the health of a machine by means of analysing various signals 
collected from different sensors. The monitoring is done in order to attain the minimum 
maintenance and failure cost that is possible under the given circumstances. Diagnostics, which 
is a central component of CBM, is defined as the detection of failure and its condition. Predictive 
maintenance is usually carried out online. One of the advantages of conducting predictive 
maintenance is that doing so allows for the scheduling of maintenance when it is required, and 
when it will have the least impact on the system, without having to rely on plant or system life 
statistics to schedule maintenance. 
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Turnout systems are one of the most important electromechanical devices in railway 
infrastructure, and CBM is used extensively to manage the equipment maintenance. Predictive 
maintenance is classified into two types, according to the methods used for detecting the signs of 
failure:  
 Condition-based predictive maintenance depends on the continuous, or periodic,
monitoring of systems to detect signs of potential failure.
 Statistical-based predictive maintenance relies on statistical data obtained from the
operational history of equipment to detect potential failure.
4.2.4 DESIGN MODIFICATION 
Design modification, which is part of an improvement maintenance strategy, is used to eliminate 
historical equipment failure, and involves redesigning a system that has been proven to be 
susceptible to frequent system failures. Such modification is implemented when the maintenance 
life cycle cost (LCC) and the downtime cost of the equipment involved is not economically 
viable.  
4.3 OBJECTIVES OF RCM
The primary objectives of RCM are to increase plant availability, and to reduce maintenance 
cost, in line with some of the following objectives: 
 To ensure that the physical asset function remains within its design and operating
requirement
 To provide comprehensive information and data that are required for design improvement
geared towards the future design, and modification, of current systems
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 To keep effective maintenance at minimal LCC
 To extend the lifespan of physical assets
 To conduct root cause analysis
 To assess the physical assets and the degree of reliability present, when developing a
maintenance programme
4.4 PRINCIPLES OF RCM 
RCM methodologies, as described by Nowlan and Heap (1978), are based on four system 
operating conditions: RTF; PM; predictive maintenance; and design modification. RCM is a 
strategy that is used to optimise maintenance. It is, therefore, important to understand that RCM 
does not prevent failure, as any physical asset will, inevitably, eventually fail, and also have 
failure characteristics. Hence, one of the goals of RCM is the identification of component failure 
characteristics, the coming to an understanding of the characteristics concerned, and the ability to 
describe the appropriate intervention required. Accordingly, the principles upon which RCM is 
based are described below (adapted from NASA, 2008). The RCM practitioner should be: 
 function-oriented, in that RCM seeks to preserve the system or equipment function by
means of focusing on maintenance efforts exerted in relation to functionally critical
components.
 system-focused, in that RCM is concerned with maintaining the overall functionality of a
system, rather than an individual component function.
 reliability-centred, in that RCM uses failure statistics in an actuarial manner to consider
the relationship between the operating lifespan, and the failures experienced. RCM
practitioners also seek to know the probability of failure within a specific lifespan.
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 able to acknowledge design limitations, in that the objective of RCM is to maintain the
inherent reliability of the system design, and also to recognise that changes in reliability
are a function of design, rather than being a function of maintenance. Maintenance can
only achieve, and maintain, the level provided for by the design concerned.
 continuously aware of safety and economics issues, in that RCM must ensure that safety
is its first and utmost priority, with cost-effectiveness being only the secondary goal.
 aware of failure as any unsatisfactory condition, as failure in a system might amount
either to a loss of function of the system, or to a loss of defined quality in the system.
 a user of a logic tree to screen maintenance tasks, as such use helps to provide a
consistent approach to the maintenance of equipment within a system.
 aware that tasks must be applicable, with the tasks concerned addressing the failure
mode, and mindful of its characteristics.
 aware that tasks must be effective, with them both reducing the probability of failure,
and being cost-effective.
 acknowledge two types of maintenance and RTF tasks, namely interval- and condition-
based.
 acknowledge that RCM is a living system, as it not only gathers data from the results
achieved, but also feeds the data back into the system, so as to improve future
maintenance management. The feedback forms an important part of the proactive
maintenance element of the RCM programme concerned.

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4.5 RCM ANALYSIS 
RCM analysis in a physical asset environment considers the following questions to determine the 
maintenance requirements: 
 What are the functions of the system, and what does it do?
 What functional failures are likely to occur?
 What causes the functional failure?
 What are the likely consequences of the aforesaid functional failures?
 What should be done to minimise the probability of failure, or to predict failure?
4.5.1 RCM IN RAILWAY INFRASTRUCTURE 
RCM application in railway infrastructure is implemented differently to the standard industrial 
system, because a railway network comprises different complex technical subsystems, with 
different functions (RAIL, 2002). As a result, the analyses and recommendations concerned 
should be based on a family of similar components, such as permanent way (consisting of 
bridges and platforms), and rolling stock. 
4.5.2 BENEFITS OF RCM IN MAINTAINING RAILWAY INFRASTRUCTURE 
One of the important objectives of RCM in maintaining railway infrastructure is to avoid, or to 
reduce, the consequences of failure, through the implementation of a PM strategy geared towards 
providing optimal system availability and safety, at the lowest possible cost. Failure 
consequences, in terms of railway infrastructure, are the effects of failure on operations, 
including delays to system, personal, and equipment safety, as well as the loss of revenue. 
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Some of the benefits of applying RCM to both new and existing components of railway 
infrastructure are the following: 
 It provides a platform for the documentation trail that serves to enhance the continuous
maintenance strategy optimisation and improvement.
 It improves the reliability and the availability of components of the system.
 It reduces the costs related to the safety and the life cycle of plants.
 It helps to preserve system function, by identifying failure modes that might otherwise
produce functional failures.
4.6 ACTIONS IN RCM PROCESS IMPLEMENTATION, IN TERMS OF RAILWAY
INFRASTRUCTURE 
The actions that are required to be undertaken in RCM process implementation consist of the 
following: 
 Selection of the system
 Definition of the system boundaries
 Description of the system
 Identification of the system functions, and of functional failures
 FMEA
 Selection of tasks
 Programme implementation
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4.7 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This Chapter introduces RCM application in railway infrastructure and document how it is 
implemented differently to the standard industrial system, because a railway network comprises 
several complex technical subsystems, with different functions and dependencies. As a result, 
railway track reliability should be based on a family of similar components of families. 
The actions required to implement RCM in railway infrastructure was presented. RCM is a 
continuous maintenance strategy, where the failure modes are identified and a programme of 
optimised maintenance plan is implemented. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
5. RAILWAY TRACK FAILURES
Failure mode and mechanism understanding in railway infrastructure is pivotal for maintaining a 
well-established manufacturing and maintenance strategy, and, thus, an adequate standard of 
reliability improvement. Rail track infrastructure (i.e. rails; switches; fasteners; sleepers; tie 
plates; rail anchors; ballast; and sub-grade) failure mechanisms vary. As a result, a statistical data 
collection of global rail failures is important for determining the trends and factors that affect 
performance. 
The monitoring and inspection of track infrastructure, especially in terms of failures, can assist in 
the design and the cost optimisation of both personnel and materials. In addition, it can aid in 
future expansion, as well as help to reduce the potential risk of rail breaks and development. In 
the United States, track defects are the second leading cause of accidents on railways (Cannon et 
al., 2003). The statistics relating to broken and defective rails in a railway system are an 
indication of the overall track quality involved, which might be due to rail age, to fatigue cracks, 
and to the degrading of track geometry (Sawley & Reiff, 2000).  
Rail defect formation, which has been on the increase globally, can be attributed to the 
significant global mean increase of axle load from 22.5 to 32.5 tonnes (Allen, 1999) without a 
corresponding increase in the frequency of inspection and maintenance. The increase has given 
rise to increased risks in rail operation, resulting from rolling contact fatigue (RCF) that is caused 
by cyclic heavy axle load, track quality degradation, increased dynamic forces and rail wear. The 
risks that are associated with the above can be controlled by means of coordinated planned rail 
testing. The testing would aid in maintaining the reliability of the system concerned, by means of 
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identifying defects and by planning for remedial actions such as the replacement of defective 
rails, repairs, operational philosophy change, and including measures relating to speed and load 
restrictions. 
5.1 RAILWAY TRACK FAILURE CLASSIFICATION 
Rail failure is defined as a broken rail, or as a defective rail that is in service, and which is within 
its service lifespan. A broken rail is described as a rail with a complete breakage, or with a 
missing part. Defect on rail is identified as a defective rail.  
5.2 RAIL FAILURE 
Railway track is one of the components in railway transportation that is subject to degradation 
and failure. Such deterioration is usually due to stresses and fatigue imposed by thermal and 
wheel–rail contact stresses. According to the International Union of Railways (UIC) code on rail 
defects (UIC-712, 2002), rail failure is classified into three groups: 
 A damaged rail is any rail which is neither cracked nor broken, but which has other
defects, generally on the rail surface.
 A cracked rail is any rail which, anywhere along its length and irrespective of the parts of
the profile concerned, has one or more gaps of no set pattern, apparent or not, the
progression of which could lead to breakage of the rail relatively rapidly.
 A broken rail is any rail which has separated into two or more pieces, or a rail from which
a piece of metal becomes detached, causing a gap of more than 50 mm in length and
more than 10 mm in depth in the running surface.
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Rail defects have been studied, categorised, and codified by the UIC (Profillidis, 2006). Hence, 
the information pertaining to the type and nature of rail failures, and to their service conditions, 
is reported, using the UIC rail codifications, by the maintenance personnel. Thus, it is pertinent 
that the staff are conversant with the UIC codification, so as to enable precise and dependable 
reporting of the failures. 
UIC uses an alphanumerical system of codification of rail failures, in common with many other 
railway establishments around the world. The code comprises four digits (ACEM-Rail, 2011). 
 The first digit indicates:
– Defects in rail ends
– Defects away from rail ends
– Defects resulting from damage to the rail
– Weld and resurfacing defects
 The second digit indicates:
– The place in the rail section where the defect originated
– The type of welding when weld or resurfacing defects are involved
 The third digit indicates:
– The pattern of the defect, in the case of a broken or cracked rail
– The nature of the defect, in the case of a damaged rail
– The cause of the defect in the case of a damaged rail
 The fourth digit makes it possible, as and when required, for a further classification to be
made by type of defect.
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Rail defects are classified systematically, based on their location of occurrence along the rail 
length, as is shown in Figure 5-1. 
Figure 5-1: Codification of Rail Defects, (Adapted from UIC 712, 2002). 
1st digit 2nd digit 3rd digit 4th digit
Location Pattern, nature
0. Full  section 1. Transverse
1. Inner side of rail  head 2. Horizontal
Situation 3. Web 3. Longitudinal  ‐ vertical
1. Rail  ends 5. Foot 4. Corrosion
2. Zone away from 
rail  end
5. Passing through a
hole
6. Not passing through a
hole
9. Lap
0. Corrugation
1. Surface defects
2. Shelling
Situation 3. Crashing
0. Full  section 4. Local  batter
5. Wheel  burns
Location Origin, cause
1. Electric flash‐butt welding 1. Bruising
2. Thermit welding 2. Faulty machining
3. Electric arc welding
3. Permanent 
deformation
4. Oxyacetylene 
(autogenous) welding
5. Pressurized‐gas welding Pattern, type
6. Induction welding 1. Transverse
7. Resurfacing 2. Horizontal  or shelling
8. Other welding systems
2. Rail‐head surface
3. Defects caused
by damage to rail
Additional  
characteristics 
and differentiation
Additional  
characteristics 
and differentiation
No 4th digit
4. Weld and
resurfacing 
defects
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5.2.1 DEFECTS IN RAIL ENDS 
Defects in rail ends are defects emanating from such ends, including longitudinal vertical 
cracking, which is also known as rail defects UIC 113 and UIC 213, which might appear at the 
railhead, or at the web, in which case UIC 133 and UIC 233 apply. These defects can lead to the 
expansion, and to the further splitting, of the railhead into two separate parts. The defects 
concerned usually emanate from manufacturing defects, and are detected by means of ultrasonic 
equipment. Figure 5-2 shows some of the defects that are found in the industry. 
Figure 5-2: Defects in the rail ends (SPOORNET, 2000). 
5.2.2 DEFECTS AWAY FROM RAIL ENDS 
Some of the different types of defects away from rail ends are described below (ACEM-Rail, 
2011), namely: 
Tache Ovale is a subsurface defect that is formed about 10–15 mm below the railhead (Kumar, 
2006). The defect is caused by the thermal effects resulting from hydrogen accumulation during 
the manufacturing process of the rails, and also when poor rail welding is done, with consequent 
expansion to reach the rail surface. Thermal and residual stresses also promote the defect 
concerned. The defect codification is identified as UIC 211.  Figure 5-3 shows a typical tache 
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ovale defect in rail. The defect is detected using ultrasonic equipment, or by means of visual 
inspection. 
Figure 5-3: Tache Ovale (Kumar, 2006). 
Horizontal crack, which is also known as rail defect UIC 212, is a defect that occurs at the 
rolling surface of a rail. It develops from the manufacturing process, in the form of initial internal 
discontinuities. The defect is detected using ultrasonic equipment, or by means of visual 
inspection. See Figure 5-4 below for typical horizontal cracks on rail. 
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Figure 5-4: Horizontal Cracking Defects (SPOORNET, 2000). 
Short-pitch rail corrugation (which is also known as rail defect UIC 2201, see Figure 5-5) is a 
type of wave-type wear on the rail surface, with a wide variety of wavelength (Oostermeijer, 
2006). Such wear leads to unpleasant noise, because of the high-frequency oscillations that they 
produce on tracks, which can give rise to: resonance; cracks at rail supports; the loosening of 
fastenings; the failure of ballast and sub-grade; and high stress, especially in terms of instances 
of RCF, like squats. The defect is largely detected by means of rail defect recording equipment, 
or by means of visual inspection. It is usually repaired by smoothing the rail. 
Figure 5-5: Short-pitch Rail Corrugation (Oostermeijer, 2006). 
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Long-pitch corrugations (which is also known as rail defect UIC 2202, see Figure 5-6) 
normally evolve under relatively high nominal axle load (> 20 tonnes) in mixed freight, or unit 
train operations (ARTC, 2006). The depth of the corrugations can range from 0.1 mm to over 
2.0 mm. Detection and repair are similar to that which is undertaken with short-pitch 
corrugations. The difference between long-pitch and short-pitch rail corrugation is according to 
their wavelength. 
Figure 5-6: Rail Corrugation (Nielsen & Torstensson, 2010). 
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Lateral wear (which is also known as rail defect UIC 2203) is caused by the snaking of the 
lateral movement of the trains, due to the conical shape of the wheels. This kind of wear, after a 
certain point, becomes dangerous, as it might affect track gauge adversely. Network operators 
normally specify the allowable range of lateral wear of railhead. Figure 5-7 below indicates a 
typical rail showing lateral wear. 
Figure 5-7: Lateral Wear (Sadeghi & Akbari, 2006). 
Rolling (running) surface disintegration (which is known as rail defect UIC 221) is a type of 
defect on rail that causes the gradual disintegration of the rolling surface of the rail. The rolling 
surface disintegration defect is detected during track maintenance inspections, and the affected 
rails are replaced during the scheduled maintenance plan. 
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Shelling of the running surface (which is also known as rail defect UIC 2221) is a type of 
defect that manifests in deformations of irregular patterns on the rail surface originating from 
subsurface defects, or at the rail running surface, which can result in considerable dislodgment of 
the rail parent metal. The deformations are caused by the high shear stress that develops in the 
wheel/rail contact region when such stress exceeds the allowable limits of the rail material 
(ARTC, 2006). The defects, which are usually encountered over large spans of tracks, are 
detectable by means of visual inspection, or with the use of ultrasonic equipment (see Figure 
5-8). 
Figure 5-8: Running Surface Defect (ARTC, 2006). 
Gauge-corner shelling (which is also known as rail defect UIC 2222) and running surface crack 
defects are caused by high shear stresses that develop in the wheel/rail contact region, when such 
stresses exceed the allowable limits of the rail material used. The factors that influence the shear 
stresses include the diameter of the wheels, the dynamic loading, and the track geometry. The 
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gauge-corner shelling defect, which normally appears on the outside rail curves, can be repaired 
by means of grinding the rail. (See Figure 5-9 below for an example of such shelling). 
Figure 5-9: Gauge-corner Shelling (Wilson et al., 2011). 
Head checking (which is also known as rail defect UIC 2223; see Figure 5-10 is caused by high 
stresses in the rail gauge corners in curves. It usually appears in the curves of radii that are under 
1 500 m, and it is usually found around welds (Kumar, 2006). Although grinding may be used to 
correct head checks, which are surface-created defects, critical defects of this nature might 
require rail replacement.  
Figure 5-10: Head Check Defects (R06C0104, 2006). 
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5.2.3 DEFECTS CAUSED BY RAIL DAMAGE 
The two types of defects that are caused by rail damage are bruising rail defect (UIC 301), and 
faulty machining rail defect (UIC 302). The former defect is caused by mostly traffic load, which 
might lead to derailments, damaged wheels, the handling of dragging parts, and arcing, whereas 
the latter defect, which is also due to traffic load, and might cause drilling of the foot, or the web, 
of the rail or improper in-track, and faulty cutting (Profillidis, 2006).  
5.2.4 WELD AND RESURFACING DEFECTS 
Welds are used in railway tracks to join discontinuities, especially on high-speed tracks. The 
problem with the welds lies in the physical properties involved, such as the thermal expansion of 
the steel, which affects the integrity of the welds adversely, and which might lead to 
discontinuity in the welds (Terashita & Tatsum, 2003). Ultrasonic and visual inspections are 
used to detect weld defects. 
5.2.5 RAIL WEAR 
Rail wear is defined as a reduction of the railhead, as a result of the abrasive action that takes 
place between the steel wheels on the steel rail (FRA, 2011). Such wear affects vehicle 
performance, wheel/rail contact, and the degradation of the rail. Rail defects tend to exacerbate 
increased stresses in the rail material, which might lead to such defects as cracks. Jendel (1999) 
and Zakharov (2001) classified rail wear into three modes, with the classifications being based 
on the wear rate, and on surface and wear debris form and size; 
 Mild wear (300 μm)
 Severe wear (500 μm)
 Catastrophic wear (1 000 μm)
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Mild wear is usually found on the wheel tread, and in the rail crown area, whereas severe wear is 
predominantly found in curves, and in dry conditions (Jendel, 1999). Scheduled grinding is used 
to maintain and correct the deformed profile. 
5.2.6 SLEEPER FAILURE 
Sleepers in railway infrastructure are one of three types: steel; timber; and concrete. Failures in 
the track usually manifest on all types of sleepers. 
5.2.6.1 STEEL SLEEPERS 
Steel sleepers, which are made from pressed steel, are trough-shaped in section, with forged ends 
to provide anchoring in ballast, so as to ensure transverse track stability. Such sleepers are easily 
installed on existing ballast, unlike the case with concrete sleepers, which require a new layer of 
ballast. As steel sleepers require much less ballast than do either concrete or wood sleepers, steel 
sleepers are therefore cost effective. 
The setback with steel sleepers is their susceptibility to chemical attack, particularly in industrial 
and coastal areas (ACEM-Rail). Such susceptibility can lead to corrosion of the steel, with them 
also developing cracks in the rail seats during service (Swarnakar, 2012). 
5.2.6.2 TIMBER SLEEPERS 
Timber sleepers, which are flexible and have better load distribution, are used in the case of 
poor-quality ballast sub-grades. The pitfall of timber sleepers is their short lifespan, compared to 
that of concrete and steel sleepers. A defect that can sometimes be found in timber sleepers 
occurs when the base plate is seated incorrectly, leading to the likelihood of a breakage. Figure 
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5-11 portrays the presence of a defect in a timber sleeper. Other types of defects that can be 
found in timber sleepers are fungal decay, and splitting at the ends. 
Figure 5-11: Timber Sleeper Failure (Hassankiadeh, 2011). 
5.2.6.3 CONCRETE SLEEPERS 
Concrete sleepers, which are brittle, tend to possess minimal fatigue resistance. As a result, the 
defects that are found in concrete sleepers tend to be severe, with one of them being concrete 
spalling. Concrete spalling is a process where the concrete has broken up and flaked, which 
occurs in the top fibre of the rail seat, and in cracks. Two types of reinforced-concrete sleepers 
are used in the industry: twin-block reinforced concrete sleeper and monoblock prestressed 
concrete sleepers.  
Failure mechanisms in concrete sleepers are identified as (Hassankiadeh, 2011): 
 Wet spot (which is also known as slurry spot)
 Damaged concrete bearers
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 Concrete spalling
 Shear cracks
 Abrasion
5.2.7 BALLAST FAILURE AND SUB-BALLAST 
Ballast is a crucial part of the substructure, because it is the only external constraint that is 
applied to the track, so as to restrain it (Lim, 2004). Ballast is subjected to the vertical force of 
the moving train, and also to the impact force of the maintenance tamping, with the forces 
concerned having the potential to lead to serious damage to the ballast (Selig & Waters, 1994).  
Despite the fact that ballast forms part of the substructure of a track system, and constitutes a 
major cost in terms of track maintenance, Selig and Waters (1994) claim that, due to the 
properties of substructure not being standardised, the selection of maintenance best practices is 
problematic. Ballast deterioration is caused by repeated loading, by the intrusion of such external 
materials as wagon spillage, by the infiltration of inherent materials into the ballast material, and 
by fouling, which causes the crushing of the ballast that is in contact with the ties (Lim, 2004). 
5.2.8 BRIDGES AND TUNNELS 
Bridges and tunnels, which form part of the railway infrastructure, are subject to deterioration, 
and, thus, to failure. The deterioration of such infrastructure is mostly due to corrosion, poor 
maintenance management, and increased load utilisation. 
5.3 RAIL TRACK FAILURE ANALYSIS 
Rail track failure, which is a major cause of rail derailment, is generally caused by either internal 
or surface defects (Cannon et al., 2003). Internal rail flaws are mostly due to the macroscopic 
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imperfections that occur during manufacturing, and which are not picked up on, due to poor 
quality control. The defects concerned, when present, tend to grow, due to the cyclic vertical and 
horizontal loading of the rail, leading to fatigue crack growth. In contrast, surface defects are 
caused by wheel–rail contact stresses at the running surface of the rail. Broken rails are grouped 
into two categories: those that lead to derailment, and those that, on detection, are called service 
failures (Schafer & Barkan, 2008). 
It is important to identify areas where the failures occur, as well as their causes. Therefore, 
comprehensive and accurate data collection is critical to be able to predict any future occurrence, 
so as to facilitate ongoing endeavours in terms of PM strategies. Rail failure analysis and 
prediction tools should always consider the following variables: rail age; rail curvature; track 
speed; grade; and rail weight. In addition, careful note should be taken of changes in track 
modulus due to the presence of such infrastructure systems as bridges and turnouts (Schafer & 
Barkan, 2008). Global rail track failures are discussed in the subsequent section. 
The consequences of rail failures are critical, as they can amount to major train derailment, and 
have severe economic impact, including the following (Cannon et al., 2003): 
 Train delays
 The cost of broken rail derailment
 Track and equipment damage
 Clean-up costs, along with a loss of revenue and associated costs
 The need to adopt preventive methods
 The need for rail grinding, rail replacement, and track surfacing
 The need for track inspection
 The need for ultrasonic and geometric testing
 The need to apply remedial treatments
 The need to replace, or, at least, to repair, rails and welds
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In South Africa, the direct costs of rail accidents in 2008–2009, as reported by the Rail Safety 
Regulator (RSR), amounted to R635 million for the period concerned. The costs included 
R575 million for Transnet Freight Rail (TFR), and R60 million for Metrorail. However, the 
overall sum did not take into account the indirect costs arising from service delays and 
cancellations. In reporting on the prevailing situation, the chief executive officer reported the fact 
that the failures concerned were blamed on the poor conditions of the infrastructure and the 
rolling stocks, but particularly highlighted poor signalling infrastructure as being the major cause 
of the failures (RSR, 2011). In the annual financial report for 2008 to 2009, of the 5 307 
occurrences recorded, 1 202 were collisions, and 1 154 derailments. More than 90% of TFR 
occurrence costs are said to be directly related to derailments and collisions.  
Derailments have resulted in costly delays on freight corridors, whereas the average number of 
trains cancelled amounts to 10 trains per day, due to accidents and other security incidents, such 
as the theft of copper cables. Likewise, in the USA, Illinois Rail Road Engineering reported 335 
broken rail derailments from 2003 to 2006, with a total cost of $176 million. As a result, the 
average cost of a broken rail derailment was $525 400 (Schafer & Barkan, 2008). Hence, the 
impact of rail failures cannot be overlooked, and improvement and reliability strategies require 
periodic revision.  
Schafer and Barkan (2008), consequently, derived a train delay cost as follows: 
C ൌ Tx ൅ ∑ ሺT െ ntሻx୫୬ୀଵ  …………………………………………………..…………. (9) 
Where: 
C = total train delay cost for multiple trains 
T = total delay time for service interruption 
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x = cost of delay per train hour  
m = number of following trains delayed = T/t 
t = hours per train arrival 
The multivariate statistical model, as follows, and which was developed by Dick (2001) to 
predict service failures, is based on established applicable track and traffic data. The model is 
based on the following equation: 
Pୱ୤ଶ ൌ ୣ
౫
ሺଵାୣ౫ሻ ……………………………………………………….………………… (10) 
u ൌ Z ൅ 0.059A ൅ 0.025AC െ 0.00008AଶCଶ ൅ 5.101 ୘ୗ ൅ 217.9
୛
ୗ െ 3861.6
୛మ
ୗమ ൅
0.897ሺ2N െ 1ሻ െ 1.108 ୔ୗ ……………………………………………..……………… (11) 
Where: 
 Psf2 = probability that a service failure occurred during a two-year period 
Z = -4.569, model-specific constant 
A = rail age (in years) 
C = curvature of track (in degrees) 
T = annual traffic (in MGT) 
S = rail weight (in pounds per yard) 
W = annual number of wheel passes (in millions) 
P = dynamic wheel load (in tons) 
N = presence of turnout (1 if present, 0 otherwise) 
Dick (2001) determined that the equation’s optimal probability threshold should be 0.5 to 
assume whether or not the location can be seen as a failure. Schafer II’s (2008) thesis modified 
Dick’s (2001) statistical model in terms of testing for validation, with the former including 
factors that might affect crack growth in rails. The models concerned are useful for predicting 
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service failure, as they can aid maintenance system engineers in improving on their 
maintenance strategies and detection methods. 
5.3.1 FAILURE PREDICTION 
Statistical methods are used for rail failure prediction, with the prediction model for failure event 
being based on event sequence data. As a result, the integrity of the data collection is important.  
In this section Weibull distribution is used to analyse the rail failure rate and reliability. The 
reliability of rails can be expressed in terms of the failure mechanism of rail and the data mining 
of failures. Statistically, rail failure is a function of its usage in terms of million gross tonnes 
(MGT) for determined conditions.  
Using the Weibull distribution for a sample size of less than 100, in the absence of median rank 
tables, the true median rank values can be approximated using Bernard’s approximation, as 
follows: 
Fሺtሻ ൌ 	 ሺ୧ି଴.ଷሻሺ୬ା଴.ସሻ ……………………………………………………………………….. (12) 
Where: 
i = is the ith failure 
n = the total number of population  
For sample sizes greater than 100, the F (t) values may be calculated from the expression of the 
mean ranks, as follows: 
Fሺtሻ ൌ 	 ୧ሺ୬ାଵ.଴ሻ ……………………………………………………………………. (13) 
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Rail failure data obtained from the Swedish rail system was used to develop the Weibull 
expression of reliability and failure rate (Chattopadhyay & Rahman, 2006). The usage span was 
720 MGT, with 208 rail breaks. Figure 5-12 shows a plot of the accumulated number of rail 
breaks, versus the accumulated breakage MGT.  
Simões (2008) identified that the failure rates of rail usually grow with the MGT. He also 
stressed that, as rail defects are mechanical in nature, failure rate grows with time. Even though 
the definition of a rail break and a rail defect is well established, when analysing rail reliability 
over time, the two have to be distinguished in the analysis undertaken. 
Figure 5-12: Cumulated Rail Break versus Accumulated MGT  
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Figure 5-13 is the Weibull plot and linear regression for the failure data. The data are from 
Chattopadhyay & Rahman, 2006. 
Figure 5-13: Weibull Plot and Linear Regression. 
Converting the time unit t to MGT, so as to obtain the required failure rate and reliability 
equations, results in the following: 
λሺMGTሻ ൌ ஒ஑ ቀ
୑ୋ୘
஑ ቁ
ஒିଵ
 ……………………………………………………………….. (14)
RሺMGTሻ ൌ exp ൤െ ቀ୑ୋ୘஑ ቁ
ஒ൨ ……………………………………………………………. (15)
Where: 
β ൌ ݉ ; β ൌ 3.0904 
y = 3.0904x ‐ 18.406
R² = 0.9066
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m = linear regression slope 
α ൌ eିቀ
ౘ
ಊቁ ……………………………………………………………………....……… (16) 
Thus, α ൌ 386 (growth factor) 
Using equation 15 and 16; 
λሺMGTሻ ൌ 3.0904386 ൬
MGT
386 ൰
ଶ.଴ଽ଴ସ
and RሺMGTሻ ൌ exp ൤െ ቀ୑ୋ୘ଷ଼଺ ቁ
ଷ.଴ଽ଴ସ൨
with 720 MGT usage span: 
λሺMGTሻ ൌ 3.0904386 ൬
720
386൰
ଶ.଴ଽ଴ସ
and RሺMGTሻ ൌ exp ൤െ ቀ଻ଶ଴ଷ଼଺ቁ
ଷ.଴ଽ଴ସ൨
λ ൌ 294	x	10ିସfailures/MGT and R ൌ 0.00104. 
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Using a usage span of 30 MGT for the above example, and the same failure rate, the resulting 
system shows a better system reliability. The same procedure can be used for such maintenance 
planning as rail grinding and inspection intervals. 
λሺMGTሻ ൌ ଷ.଴ଽ଴ସଷ଼଺ ቀ
ଷ଴
ଷ଼଺ቁ
ଶ.଴ଽ଴ସ
and RሺMGTሻ ൌ exp ൤െ ቀ ଷ଴ଷ଼଺ቁ
ଷ.଴ଽ଴ସ൨
λ ൌ 383.88	x	10ି଻failures/MGT and 
R ൌ 0.99962 
The above-mentioned values aid a maintenance department in undertaking a comparative 
analysis of rail reliability and failure rates, so as to put the effects of MGT on rail failures in 
perspective.  
5.4 GLOBAL RAIL TRACK FAILURES DATA 
The failure data from track failures around the globe are an indication of the associated trends 
that are witnessed in the industry. They can be used to benchmark best practices in relation to 
their maintenance strategies and operational philosophy. However, the performance concerned is 
based on different variables, such as operational conditions, train speed, axle load, rail–wheel 
material type, size and profile, track construction, characteristics of bogie type, MGT, curvature, 
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traffic type, the weather, and the environment. Nevertheless, the information is still useful for 
obtaining insights and probability predictions. 
International railway companies are analysed using data collected by Sawley and Reiff (2000). 
The defects were noted from 1998 and 1999 for Banverket railways. The Table 5-1 and Table 
5-2 show the percentage of defects for each railway company, with the data involved indicating 
the relationship between rail defects and broken rails in Table 5-1 & Table 5-2. As a result, the 
information given can be used to investigate the risk of rail breaks, in terms of both mechanical 
and statistics. 
Table 5-1: Causes of Defective Rails (Sawley & Reiff, 2000). 
Railway             Percentages of Defective Rails by Defect Type 
SNCF (1999) Squats 
23.4% 
Internal 
fatigue 11.5% 
Shells 
8.4% 
Thermite 
welds 4.7% 
- 
HSPC (1999) Thermite 
welds 31.5% 
Wheel burns 
17.2% 
Horizontal 
split webs 
13.3% 
Bolt holes 
11.3% 
Flash weld 
5.9% 
Banverket 
(1998) 
Transverse 
fracture 55.1% 
Welded joint 
32.7% 
Horizontal 
defect 6.1% 
Vertical split 
2.0% 
Others 
2.0% 
HH1 (1999) Vertical split 
heads 34.7% 
Thermite 
welds 20.3% 
Detail 
fractures 
13.1% 
Bolt holes  
12.2% 
Flash weld  
7.7% 
HH2 (1999) Transverse 
defects 23.6% 
Thermite 
welds 15.5% 
Wheel burns 
13.2% 
Shells 9.6% Vertical split 
head 8.1% 
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Table 5-2: Broken Rails (Sawley & Reiff, 2000). 
Railway Percentage of Broken Rails 
SNCF (1999) Thermite 
welds 35.3% 
Internal 
fatigue 18.6% 
Squats 
8.8% 
Rail 
manufacture 
6.1% 
Damage   
3.3% 
HH2 (1999) Transverse 
defects 37.9% 
Thermite 
welds 35.6% 
Bolt holes  
5.8% 
Flash welds  
5.6% 
Broken base 
4.2% 
The maintenance and reliability management of broken rails and defects can be undertaken by 
means of risk-based assessment and rail test planning. Doing so would enable the operators to 
determine the optimum rail test intervals per segment of track, based on a defined level of risk 
for the segment concerned. Zarembski and Palese (2006) recommend the use of service defect 
rate-based risk definitions, which would aid in defining the maximum allowable risk for different 
traffic type (see Table 5-3).  
Table 5-3: Broken Rail Risk Guideline (Zarembski & Palese, 2006). 
Risk [service defects (rail breaks)/mile 
year] 
Traffic Type 
0.09 - 0.10 General freight route (no passenger or hazardous material)
0.07 - 0.08 Key freight line 
0.06 - 0.07 Freight route with hazardous material, but no passenger 
traffic 
0.04 - 0.06 Freight with limited passenger traffic 
0.01 - 0.03 Low-speed passenger route (less than 90 mph) 
0.005 - 0.01 Moderate-speed passenger route (90 mph to 125 mph) 
0.001 High-speed passenger line route (125 mph and higher) 
Table 5-3 can be used for improved maintenance strategy, where risks control can be planned by 
identifying and putting in place risk control, hence managing potential rail failures.    
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5.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In concluding this chapter, the following summary statements are made with regard to the 
reasons for the high increase in the number of broken rails: 
 The amount of RCF has increased dramatically as a result of the introduction of
bogies with higher wheel set yaw stiffness.
 The degradation of track quality has increased wheel irregularities, thus leading to the
presence of increased dynamic forces.
 The axle load and traffic have increased, without a corresponding increase in the
frequency of inspection and maintenance-related activity.
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CHAPTER SIX 
6. RELIABILITY IMPROVEMENT
Reliability, apart from being consistent over time, is measurable and can be traced with the same 
methodology. Therefore, the data collection and reporting procedures employed must be 
reproducible, dependable, and accurate. Reliability improvement should be focused on failure 
prevention, rather than on failure prediction. As a result, the present section is focused on the 
methods and the techniques employed in improving railway track reliability. Zero system break-
down can be a goal, but is not attainable in a real world scenario. A plant or system design 
philosophy should utilise a combination of strategies to maintain system reliability, with such 
strategies including those relating to redundancy, PM, and CM, among other aspects. 
Such statistical metrics as the reliability index, MTBF, MTTF, mean distance between failures 
(MDBF), MTTR, and availability are traditionally used to highlight the performance, or the 
reliability, of a railway infrastructure. The measures concerned usually have not been able to 
highlight areas of poor performance that can be used to improve the component reliability, 
because they are usually the averages of a region, the performance index of either a month or 
year, which is not consistent with the utilisation of each depot or rail segment.  
Reliability improvement and, thus, the performance improvement of a railway infrastructure can 
be achieved by means of the use of both qualitative and quantitative methods. Therefore, the 
utilisation factor should be used in union to highlight the measure of reliability of a rail system.  
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Some of the sources of railway track unreliability that has been gathered from the literature 
studies, and from the railway station depot visits, are summarised as follows: 
 Poor design of components and systems
 Manufacturing defects and inherent flaws (i.e. internal defects)
 Poor maintenance policies, strategies and implementations
 Organisational rigidity and complexity
 Human error
 Lack of critical skilled personnel (engineers and technicians for failures reporting,
and reliability analysis).
In the current study, the reliability improvement of rail infrastructure is investigated on the basis 
of two concepts, namely design modification and maintenance management optimisation. The 
focus of the current chapter would be on reliability improvement through the latter means, but an 
overview of reliability improvement through the former means will also be discussed.  
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Figure 6-1 is the cause and effect diagram of rail unreliability. The diagram is also known as 
Ishikawa or Fishbone diagram.  The diagram groups four possible causes that may lead to rail 
unreliability i.e. manufacturing, environment, design, operating conditions and maintenance. 
Figure 6-1: Cause and Effect of Rail Unreliability. 
6.1 RELIABILITY IMPROVEMENT THROUGH DESIGN MODIFICATION 
The criterion of reliability is used to measure system performance and availability. Such 
measurement can be achieved by setting reliability targets, as well as by means of designing 
system components for reliability, maintainability, and reliability modelling. Reliability forms 
part of the conceptual and detailed design process of system development. However, after the 
equipment is designed and installed, the reliability of the system becomes a quality process that 
is subject to continuous measurement and analysis, so as to ensure that it performs according to 
the reliability design intent. However, due to dynamic changes in the operation and the 
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environment, the design reliability might not be achieved, thus the modification of design is 
necessary when consistent failures or defects are seen. 
The reliability of rail track infrastructure can be improved by means of design, such as the 
following: 
 The designing of rail tracks with high reliability characteristics, involving the choosing of
components with good RAMS features, as well as a high MTBF, and a low MTTR
 Improved designs for rail components, such as rail pads, ballast, and turnouts
 The incorporation of online failure and smart wear detection systems
 Designing for ‘graceful degradation’ such as rail track
 Design that accommodates future expansion and loading.
The reliability of a component, or of a system, is a function of design, and not of maintenance. 
Hence, a system with good reliability evolves from a robust design that encompasses all possible 
failure and operational philosophy to which the system is likely to be subjected during its design 
life. Design modification, or change management, is recommended by reliability engineers when 
there is an increased occurrence of operational breakdown that leads to the conclusion that the 
system/components have an inherent flaw, or that the system could perform better with a new 
design, and at lower LCC. The improvement of rail infrastructure reliability can be viewed as 
enhancing either inherent or operational reliability.  
When the inherent reliability of the system/components is faulty, the system/component 
modification is eminent. However, faulty operational reliability might be due to poor 
maintenance and personnel management, which is likely to be able to be improved with the 
implementation of improved maintenance management policies. 
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Rail tracks tend to be designed for high reliability, but when failures or defects are experienced, 
the repair and recoverable time that is taken up in replacing or repairing them are high, due to the 
non-availability of the tracks in the interim. Rail failures are generally caused by defects in the 
rail materials, and wear, resulting from the high demand for train transportation, the increased 
train speed, and the heightened axle load involved. It has become of paramount importance to 
improve the rail track reliability through design modifications, such as by means of railhead 
hardening and by improving the design for sharp bends, as well as the rail material used. Doing 
so should contribute to ensuring that rail track can withstand wear, load, erosion, and 
manufacturing defects in future. 
6.2 RELIABILITY IMPROVEMENT BY MEANS OF MAINTENANCE IMPROVEMENT 
Reliability improvement of railway infrastructure, in terms of both repairable and non-repairable 
systems, can be improved by following certain maintenance strategies that are aimed at 
increasing rail service life and at failure prevention.  
Maintenance management is the combination of all technical and administrative actions that are 
intended to restore a system, or component, to a state in which it can perform its required 
function. Maintenance management activities that can be used to improve reliability, and thus 
availability, include the following, among others: 
 Improved structuring and organisation of the operation and maintenance service
 Standardisation of operation and maintenance activities
 Performance measurement and cost-benefit analysis of maintenance management
 Introducing measures of redundancy in critical applications, where it is practical to
implement.
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The improvement of rail reliability by means of the implementation of improved maintenance 
policies could be achieved by way of selecting the appropriate maintenance strategy that is based 
on the likelihood and consequence of failure. The historical data relating to failures, and to the 
performance of a railway depot, can be used to improve future reliability by means of evaluating 
the maintenance performance and the skill levels of the maintenance personnel and operators 
involved. Maintenance operations are not exclusively dependent on the condition of the system 
or the component, as they are influenced, in some instances, by plant downtime opportunities. 
The influence is due to the high rate of some railway track utilisation throughout the day. As a 
result, much planning has to be done to schedule maintenance operations at an appropriate time, 
when there is either relatively little, or no, traffic. 
Railway infrastructure, such as rails, consists of critical non-redundant equipment, requiring that 
it be maintained at 100% reliability, if the operational intent is to achieve 100% availability. In 
contrast, redundant equipment, such as rolling stock, is not maintained at 100% reliability, 
because it accumulates hours unevenly, so as to ensure that low-hour equipment is always 
available when it is required. Thus, for a rail to have acceptable set target reliability, a 
maintenance strategy must be in place to achieve the following: 
 Improved spares inventory management
 Improved system reliability
 Decreased system downtime
 Decreased cost of replacing track components
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6.2.1 FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) 
FMEA is a reliability method by means of which each potential failure mode in a system is 
analysed to determine the results, or effects, thereof on the system, as well as to be able to 
categorise each potential failure mode according to its risk probability number (RPN) 
(IEC 60812, 2001). If the analysis is carried out to categorise each potential failure mode 
according to its severity and probability of occurrence, the analysis is called a failure mode, 
effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA).  
FMECA is used in maintenance planning so as to monitor items whose failure modes cost more, 
and that take the longest to repair, as well as limiting the functionality of the system by the 
greatest degree. FMECA also provides for the identification of reliability critical items that are 
likely to require improvement. 
FMEA, when performed in terms of a system, enables the identification of faults that can lead to 
system failure, so that they can be detected, isolated, and removed, for the preservation of system 
integrity. FMEA uses inductive logic in a ‘bottom- up’ approach, starting at the lowest level of 
the system hierarchy. By means of assessing the failure modes of each part of the system, the 
reliability engineer then traces the modes up through the system hierarchy to determine the effect 
that each has on the system’s performance. FMEA differs, in its ‘bottom-up’ approach, from 
fault tree analysis (FTA), which utilises inferential logic in a ‘top-down’ approach (MIL-HDBK-
338b, 1998). In FTA, the reliability engineer, assuming the nature of the system failure, and 
traces down through the system hierarchy to determine the event, or the series of events, that 
could probable cause the failure. 
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Whereas FMEA uses a qualitative method, FMECA uses a quantitative method. Both, however, 
are used extensively during the design phase for purposes of reliability improvement. Typically, 
quantitative measures are: the reliability index; availability; failure rates; and MTTF 
(Singpurwalla, 2013). 
6.2.2 PURPOSE OF AN FMEA/FMECA STUDY 
Below are some of the major objectives of FMEA/FMECA: 
 To provide an effective method for evaluating the effect of proposed changes to the
design.
 To identify failures that has unwanted effects on system performance, safety, and
operations.
 To allow for improvement of the system’s maintainability (by highlighting areas of risk,
or nonconformity, for maintainability).
 To allow for the determination of the significance, or the criticality, of each failure mode,
and its impact on the reliability, or safety, of the system.
 To allow for the development of design improvement plans geared towards mitigating
failure modes.
 To support the development of an effective maintenance management, so as to mitigate,
or to minimise, system failures.
6.2.3 PRINCIPLES OF FMEA/FMECA 
The basis of an FMEA/FMECA study is to review a system/equipment in a series of meetings. 
During the meetings, a multidisciplinary team strategically analyses the system design, so as to 
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identify all possible failure modes and causes and effects of the failures. In addition, any 
safeguards that are already in place can be identified at such meetings, so as to allow for the 
mitigation of any potential failure, through its identification and recording.  
The advantage of the expert approach group is that it stimulates thought processes, and helps to 
ensure the input of necessary expertise. FMECA is undertaken using a risk matrix, which is 
employed to estimate the severity, and the probability, of each failure mode, so that it can be 
assigned a criticality rank. Such ranking assists the team in identifying areas, or components, that 
require most attention. The FMEA/FMECA team then exercises its judgement as to whether the 
equipment, or the system, requires modification, or further action, in terms of the risk involved, 
and whether any relevant recommendations should be implemented. The analysis is then 
recorded on the appropriate FMEA/FMECA worksheets (Singpurwalla, 2013). 
The application of an FMEA/FMECA is preceded by a hierarchical decomposition of the system 
into its more basic elements. Such decomposition can be done with the assistance of simple 
block diagrams, or with the aid of existing functional diagrams, with the analysis then starting 
with the lowest level components. A failure mode effect at a lower level might then become a 
failure mode of an item in the next higher level. The analysis proceeds in a bottom-up fashion 
until the end effect on the system is identified. Risk is assessed in terms of RPN, which is a 
product of severity, occurrence, and detection (MIL-HDBK-338b, 1998).  
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6.3 PRASA MAINTENANCE STRATEGY 
Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (PRASA), which is a wholly state-owned company, 
operates the rail operation of metro commuter long-distance intercity and cross-border services. 
Figure 6-2 is the component of track maintenance strategy. These events are interdependent, but 
not necessary sequential and are used for maintenance planning and capital reinvestment. 
Figure 6-2: Track maintenance Chain of Events. 
PRASA’s Metrorail maintenance and reliability department use enterprise maintenance planning 
and control (EMPAC) system, in terms of which maintenance performance, planning, and the 
budget are documented. However, it must be borne in mind that the PRASA EMPAC system 
might be comprehensive, but not exhaustive, EMPAC gives only the regional and national 
perspective of the performance and budget.  
Maintenance 
Planning
Inspectionn
Repair
Replacement
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The maintenance interval for such items as track cannot be based on the national or regional 
MTBF prescription, because the MTBF and the MTTR are averages that are based on constant 
failure rates. As a result, the Metrorail EMPAC system does not take into consideration each 
depot’s utilisation, history, loading, and environment. Neither does it take into account the skill 
levels of inspectors, nor the track geometry involved. Therefore, the strategy is neither cost-
effective, nor technically reliable. 
PRASA Metrorail maintenance strategies of its track are presented in Table 6-1. 
Table 6-1: On-Track Maintenance. 
ON-TRACK MAINTENANCE 
Work Unit Work Frequency 
PLANNED ROUTINE 
MAINTENANCE 
OPERATIONAL STATE 
ASSESSMENT 
Infrastructure measuring vehicle Track km 4-monthly 
PHYSICAL STATE 
ASSESSMENT 
Running lines: tangent track Track km 48-monthly 
Running lines: curved track Track km 48-monthly 
Running lines: turnouts Unit 12-monthly 
Running lines: ultrasonic rail 
testing 
Track km 6-monthly 
Running lines: rail stress 
assessment 
Track km 12-monthly 
Yard track Track km 48-monthly 
Yard turnouts Unit 24-monthly 
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SAFETY INSPECTIONS 
FOOT PATROLLING 
Running lines ‘A-corridors’ Track km Twice daily 
Running lines ‘B- & C-corridors’ Track km Weekly 
Yards Track km Monthly
SAFETY INSPECTIONS 
TURNOUTS 
Running lines: turnouts Unit  Monthly 
Yard turnouts Unit 6-monthly 
TROLLEY INSPECTIONS 
Track inspector’s trolley Track km Half-monthly 
Regional engineer’s trolley Track km 2 monthly 
Table 6-1 above indicates the on-track maintenance of PRASA Metrorail. The maintenance 
items concerned comprise planned maintenance that is undertaken in a projected financial year. 
The items are evaluated at the end of the year to see whether the set targets have been achieved. 
The frequencies are from identified failure mechanisms, as well as from the original equipment 
manufacturers, and from the qualitative and quantitative analysis undertaken by the PRASA 
technical head office. The maintenance strategy is presented to depots across the various 
provinces and regions for implementation. 
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The scheduled maintenance activities that are shown in Table 6-2, after being determined on the 
basis of risk analysis and maintenance best practices, are implemented across the regions. 
Table 6-2: Scheduled Maintenance Activities (PRASA, 2013). 
SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES 
SCHEDULED ACTIVITIES Work Unit Work Frequency 
Tangent track and curved track 
Level crossings Unit Monthly 
Track lubricators Unit Monthly 
Block joints Unit 6-monthly 
Fish plated joints track km Yearly 
Track signage track km Yearly 
The PRASA Metrorail CM frequency (see Table 6-3) is not determined at head office, but the 
responsibility for the establishment of such frequency is left to the depot level. The maintenance 
strategy concerned seems to be executed at the depot level as a ‘run–to–failure maintenance’, by 
assuming which of the items are not critical to railway track availability. 
Table 6-3: Corrective Maintenance (PRASA, 2013). 
CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE (DAY–TO–DAY) 
Work Unit Work Frequency 
Track maintenance 
Repair geometry  Unit As required 
Spot rail replacement Unit As required 
Spot sleeper replacement (turnouts) Unit As required 
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Transposition of rails Unit As required 
Repair of UMC-detected defects Unit As required 
Replacement of stock and switches Unit As required 
Replacement of crossings Unit As required 
Replacement of field block joints Unit As required 
Load/Offload rails Unit As required 
De-stressing of continuous welded 
rails 
Unit As required
De-stressing of jointed track Unit As required 
Replacement of sleeper fastenings Unit As required 
Offload ballast Unit As required 
Track Welding 
Crossings Unit As required
Battered rail ends Unit As required 
Skid marks Unit As required 
Alumino thermit welding Unit As required 
Grinding overlap Unit As required 
If intensive and adequate condition monitoring is in place together with the principle of early 
detection of faults and remedial action/maintenance before the defect becomes critical, then the 
system cannot (Table 6-3) be considered run-to-failure. 
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6.4 CLUSTER MAINTENANCE STRATEGY 
PRASA utilises a centralised system of maintenance strategy, where the prescribed maintenance 
and inspection interval for its infrastructure are documented, and roll-out to regions and depots. 
One of the major advantages of this strategy is the standardised procedures. However during the 
course of PRASA Metrorail depot visitation and consultation, it was found that the failure events 
and traffic utilisation are not following similar trends across train station depots. This prompt for 
a decentralised maintenance strategy  
Cluster maintenance strategy is recommended for PRASA Metrorail. Cluster maintenance 
strategy for railway track infrastructure can be described as a maintenance strategy, where train 
station depots with similar infrastructure, critical failure events, traffic utilisation, resources and 
prevailing environment utilises a centralised preventive maintenance strategy for the identified 
cluster/s train depot stations.  
6.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In concluding this chapter, the following summary statements are made; 
 The review of PRASA’s Metrorail maintenance strategy and philosophy, which uses the
enterprise maintenance planning and control (EMPAC) system, in terms of which
maintenance performance, planning, and the budget are documented.
 General reliability improvement was reviewed on the basis of two concepts, namely
design modification and maintenance management optimisation.
 FMEA reliability improvement was introduced and the principles and objective reviewed.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
7. CASE STUDY PRASA METRORAIL
PRASA Metrorail failure analysis is conducted with focus on Gauteng South. Gauteng South 
covers 15 train stations with total travel kilometres of 661 km. See APPENDIX A for detailed 
information of the train stations.  
7.1 FAILURE ANALYSIS - PARETO 
Pareto analysis assists the maintenance department in identifying components that have the 
highest contribution and impact to system failures. Pareto analysis uses the database of failures 
to identify where resources and research should be directed. It’s a first system analysis of failures 
analysis. Gauteng South Track number of events, Response time and Outage time that were 
recorded for the year 2012 – 2013 (PRASA, 2013). The data showed that; 
 Total number of failure events : 868
 Total failure response time : 578 hours
 Total failure outage time : 1680 hours
Therefore the average response time per event is 0.67 hours and average outage time per event is 
1.94 hours. 
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Figure 7-1 is the Pareto analysis of GAUTENG SOUTH PERWAY NUMBER OF FAILURE 
EVENTS for the year 2012 – 2013. CALLS TO PERWAY due to railway section defects 
recorded the highest number of failure events (183) followed by defective rails with 172 failure 
events and 105 failures events for sub-standard geometry. The three frequent failure events can 
be attributed to mechanical degraded railway track. 
Figure 7-1: Gauteng South Perway Number of Events. 
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Figure 7-2 is the Pareto analysis of GAUTENG SOUTH PERWAY RESPONSE TIME. 
Defective rails recorded the highest response time, followed by sub-standard geometry and 
defective block joints in PRASA Metrorail Gauteng South Perway. These areas need 
improvement from PRASA maintenance department. 
Figure 7-2: Gauteng South Total Response Time Perway. 
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Figure 7-3 is GAUTENG SOUTH PERWAY OUTAGE TIME. The three failure events that 
contributed significantly to PRASA Metrorail outage time are defective rails, skid marks and 
sub-standard geometry. These items require corrective replacement. 
 
Figure 7-3: Gauteng South Total Outage Time Perway. 
The summary: 
 Defective rails – 154 minutes/failure events 
 Skid marks – 251 minutes/failure events 
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 Sub-standard geometry – 60 minutes/failure events
Figure 7-4 show the frequency of defective rails in Gauteng South. The failures from Perway – 
Track are mostly due to rail failures that need attention from Perway personnel, which account 
for 21% of the failures. 
Figure 7-4: Gauteng South Failure Modes Distribution Perway 2012-2013. 
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Table 7-1 is the Capital intervention for Gauteng South for the year 2012-2013. The capital 
interventions are planned corrective replacement and repair activities to restore component 
reliability.  
Table 7-1: PRASA/Metrorail Capital Intervention Programme – Gauteng South. 
PROJECTS 2012/2013
Description Unit Qty Amount [ZAR] 
Rerail (Sections > 35m) km rail 8.39 12,582,000 
Resleeper (Sections > 35m) km track 9.67 11,602,799 
Replace turnouts 1:9 e.a. 4 3,640,000 
Replace turnouts 1:12 e.a. 10 9,200,000 
Replace single slips e.a. 1 2,710,000 
Replace double slips e.a. 3 8,610,000 
Replace diamond crossings e.a. - - 
Replace scissors crossings e.a. - - 
Replace major turnout components e.a. 40 6,400,000 
Replace block joints e.a. 120 3,600,000 
Replace section fencing km 2 2,000,000 
Ballast screening km track 40 12,800,000 
Replace ballast during screening operation km track 20 1,920,000 
Rail re-profiling km track 60 9,000,000 
Continuous ballast tamping operation Km track 600 12,000,000 
Rehabilitation of formation Sum 1 1,000,000 
Drainage upgrading sum 2 2,000,000 
Replace turnout sleepers (universal type) e.a. 5 1,500,000 
Rehabilitation of Service Roads e.a. 1 1,000,000 
Bridge rehabilitation sum 2 2,000,000 
PERWAY TOTAL R 103,564,799 
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Continuous ballast tamping operation maintenance was planned for 91% of total travel kilometre 
of Gauteng South track. Ballast tamping is used to restore and align track geometry. 
7.1.1 FMEA CASE STUDY 
RCM is a continuous decision-making process for identifying the best-suited maintenance 
requirements, as well as management decisions and actions, for a system, in accordance with its 
LCC and safety. FMEA/FMECA is part of RCM. 
Railway track failures can be grouped into two major groups: 
 Deformation from Geometry: These types of failure events are caused by deformation of
supporting components of the railway track such as ballast, subgrade and ties.  Geometry
deformation can be corrected with corrective maintenance strategy. FMEA and failure
tree analysis (FTA) can address the root cause of the subsystems that contribute to the
failures.
 Mechanical: These types of failure events are caused by degradation initiated by wear,
loads and environmental conditions. Mechanical events in most instances in railway track
cannot be corrected; hence replacements of the components are required.
Understanding the failure modes and effects would assist in determining the optimum 
maintenance strategy. Table 7-2 is the summary of critical failure mode and effect analysis of 
PRASA Metrorail track. The table shows that most of the failures can be prevented by regular 
inspection,  maintenance and improved detection systems, therefore to improve a reliable railway 
track, the maintenance strategy should aim at; 
 Preventive maintenance to prevent costly capital reinvestment
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 Capital reinvestment to extend the life of degraded components (see APPENDIX B for
the ranking of Gauteng South track components)
 Improved failure detection system so as to choose the appropriate corrective or
preventive maintenance.
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Table 7-2: FMEA Railway Track. 
No Description Failure Cause  Failure Effects Failure 
Detection 
Maintenance Strategy 
1.0 Rail  
1.1 Rail Corrugation Axle loads, inconsistency traffic 
speeds, curve radius, rail support 
conditions, plastic flow of 
materials 
Rail degradation of  
rail components such 
as rail pads, sleepers, 
clips, welds, bolt holes 
Visual, Laser Rail Grinding to 
improve profiles 
1.2 Squat Defects High dynamic load Rail failure Ultrasonic 
Inspection, 
Visual 
Preventive rail 
grinding, lubrication, 
1.3 Tache Ovale Excessive hydrogen in welds and 
rail steel 
Rail failure, increased 
maintenance cost  
Ultrasonic Rail 
Inspection, 
eddy currents 
Better quality improved 
manufacturing and 
welds 
1.4 Horizontal Split 
Head 
Metallurgical problems in 
manufacturing 
Rail failure, 
maintenance cost 
Ultrasonic 
Inspection 
Grinding, Frequent 
inspection and 
replacement 
1.5 Vertical Split Head Metallurgical problems in 
manufacturing 
Rail failure, 
maintenance cost 
Ultrasonic 
Inspection 
Grinding, Frequent 
inspection and 
replacement 
1.6 Rolling Contact 
Fatigue Defects 
High shear stresses, axle loads, 
rail geometry 
Rail failures Eddy Currents, 
visual & 
ultrasonic 
inspection,  
Rail lubrication, Higher 
strength rails, rail 
grinding 
1.7 Broken Bolt Excessive longitudinal forces on 
the crossings, manufacturing 
defects, corrosion, improper 
Derailment, rail failure, 
maintenance cost 
Visual 
Inspection, 
radiography 
Scheduled 
Replacement, Improved 
design and replacement 
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torque 
1.8 Broken or Cracked 
Fishplate 
Inadequate support to the rail 
sleepers, corrosion 
Rail buckling, rail 
degradation 
Visual 
Inspection 
Scheduled 
Replacement, Improved 
design and replacement 
      
2.0 Sleepers     
2.1 Concrete Sleeper     
2.1.1 Concrete Spalling Rusted reinforcing, weather Increased maintenance 
cost, Failure 
Visual 
Inspection 
Corrective repair / 
replacement 
maintenance 
2.1.2 Cracks Shear at the top, lack of concrete 
cover, Crack due to tamping 
machines, torsional load, ballast 
pollution, drainage problems, 
shocks, increased loading  
Structural integrity 
compromised, failure, 
derailment 
Visual 
Inspection 
Manufacturing quality 
control 
2.1.3 Rail Seat 
Deterioration 
(RSD) 
Rail seat abrasion, hydraulic 
pressure cracking, chemical 
deterioration, fastener wear, 
traffic, curvature, moisture 
Derailments, Increased 
track maintenance cost 
Machine Vision Corrective 
Replacement, shape 
recognition 
2.1.4 Split Concrete 
Sleeper 
Tamping  machine, loading from 
non-uniform support 
Structural integrity 
compromised, failure, 
derailment 
Visual 
Inspection 
Corrective 
Replacement 
      
2.2 Timber Sleeper     
2.2.1 Fungal Decay Attack from micro-organism Structural integrity 
compromised, failure 
Visual 
Inspection 
Moisture control, 
fungicide, impregnation 
with synthetic 
chemicals 
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2.2.2 Termite Attacks Termite attacks Structural integrity 
compromised, failure 
Visual 
Inspection 
Treatment with 
chemical such as 
creosote, physical 
barriers,  
2.3 Steel Sleeper 
2.3.1 Corrosion Supporting soils agents, moisture Sleeper failure, track 
geometry deficiency 
Visual and 
Ultrasonic 
Inspection 
Protective coating 
2.3.2 Fatigue Cracking Cyclic loading Sleeper failure, track 
geometry deficiency 
Visual and 
Ultrasonic 
Inspection 
Corrective 
Replacement, increased 
inspection frequency 
3.0 Ballast 
3.1 Ballast Pockets Load induced depressions 
beneath the ballast layer 
Structural integrity, 
track settlement 
Visual 
Inspection 
Corrective maintenance 
– draining the ballast
pocket 
3.2 Erosion Water in the subgrade Structural integrity 
compromised, loss of 
track restrain and 
alignment 
Visual 
Inspection 
Blanket material – 
preventive 
maintenance, frequent 
inspection 
3.3 Ballast Fouling Contamination by fine grained 
aggregate, metal rust 
Deformation of ballast 
section, misalignment 
Ground 
penetration 
radar (GPR), 
visual 
inspection 
Bio remediation, 
Corrective replacement 
3.4 Shear Cyclic loading, high water 
content, fine grained subgrade 
Breakage of the sharp 
ballast particles, 
GPR, visual 
inspection, 
Corrective replacement 
of Ballast 
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soil integrity compromise, 
derailment 
automatic 
ballast sampling
4.0 Subgrade 
4.1 Plastic Deformation Soil compaction, cyclic loading-
liquefaction 
Differential track 
settlement, track 
geometry compromise 
Visual 
Inspection,  
Accelerometers, 
Settlement 
probes 
Preventive 
maintenance- subgrade 
replacement, 
geotextiles for 
improvement 
4.2 Consolidated 
Settlement 
Embankment weight – increased 
soil stress and settlement 
Track geometry 
compromise, track 
settlement 
Visual 
Inspection 
Corrective 
maintenance- 
geotechnical 
engineering 
4.3 Shear Failure Cyclic loading, high water 
content, fine grained subgrade 
soil 
Inhibits drainage, 
increase track 
maintenance 
Visual 
Inspection,  
Accelerometers 
Preventive 
maintenance- subgrade 
replacement, 
geotextiles for 
improvement 
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7.1.2 FMEA FRAMEWORK CASE STUDY 
The conceptual framework presented here is comprised of FMECA failure events, occurrence 
evaluation, severity evaluation criteria, detection evaluation, risk priority numbers and risk 
assessment value. The objective is to get an improved categorisation of the most critical failure 
modes from the categorisation described in Figure 7-1. 
Table 7-3 is the occurrence evaluation ratings used in evaluating PERWAY failures occurrence,  
Table 7-4 is the severity ratings measured according to the outage time of the failure and Table 
7-5 is the detection rating of the FMEA. 
Table 7-3: FMEA Occurrence Evaluation (Adapted from Sameni, M.K., (2012)). 
Failures rate 
(Average per day in 
Gauteng South) 
Ranking 
Very high Persistent failures 
40 or more 10 
20 9 
High Frequent failures 
10 8 
5 7 
Moderate Occasional failures 
2 6 
1 5 
Low Relatively few failures 
0.5 4 
0.2 3 
Remote Failure is unlikely 
0.1 2 
0.05 1 
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Table 7-4: FMEA Severity Evaluation (Adapted from Sameni, M.K., (2012)). 
Severity evaluation criteria Outage 
Average delay minutes per incident 
Ranking 
Extremely disrupting More than 160 minutes 10 
Very disrupting Up to 160 minutes 9 
Very high  Up to 80 minutes 8 
High Up to 40 minutes 7 
Moderate Up to 20 minutes 6 
Low Up to 10 minutes 5 
Very low Up to 5 minutes 4 
Minor Up to 2 minutes 3 
Very minor Up to 1 minute 2 
None  No discernible effect on network 1 
Table 7-5: Detection Evaluation (Adapted from Sameni, M.K., (2012)). 
Detection Description Ranking 
Not detectable The risk is not detectable by existing control 
mechanisms in the system 
10 
Almost undetectable The risk is almost undetectable by existing control 
mechanisms in the system
9 
Very low There is very low chance that the risk is detected by 
existing control mechanisms in the system 
8 
Low There is low chance that the risk is detected by existing 
control mechanisms in the system
7 
Moderately low There is moderately low chance that the risk is detected 
by existing control mechanisms in the system 
6 
Moderate There is 50-50 chance that the risk is detected by 
existing control mechanisms in the system 
5 
Moderately high There is moderately high chance that the risk is detected 
by existing control mechanisms in the system 
4 
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High There is high chance that the risk is detected by existing 
control mechanisms in the system 
3 
Very high There is very high chance that the risk is detected by 
existing control mechanisms in the system 
2 
Definitely detectable The risk is definitely detectable by existing control 
mechanisms in the system 
1 
Risk priority numbers (RPN) is used to prioritise components that require greater considerations. 
Table 7-6 is the RPN showing the ranking for PRASA Metrorail Perway failure events for the 
year 2012 - 2013.  Defective rails score the highest RPN, followed by defective block joints, 
which translate to highest priority when planning for maintenance.  
Risk priority number (RPN): Occurence	 ൈ Severity	 ൈ Detection 
Table 7-6: Risk Priority Numbers. 
Failure Events O S D RPN RPN Priority 
Ranking 
Defective Block Joint 4 9 8 288 2 
Defective Perway Fastenings 2 9 8 144 7 
Defective Rails 5 9 7 315 1 
Derailment 1 10 7 70 8 
Sub-Standard Geometry 3 9 8 216 5 
No Operation 9 6 5 270 4 
Skidmarks 1 10 7 70 8 
Ontrack Welding 2 4 7 56 9 
Calls Perway Personnel 5 6 5 150 6 
Obstructions 5 8 7 280 3 
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RAV is focused on the ability of the system to detect failures, and manage failures.  RAV is 
proposed due to the outage time and repair time contribution to rail unavailability.  
Table 7-7 is the RAV and priority ranking. No Operation recorded the highest RAV priority 
followed by defective rails which had the highest RPN. 
Risk assessment value (RAV): ୗୣ୴ୣ୰୧୲୷	ൈ	୓ୡୡ୳୰ୣ୬ୡୣୈୣ୲ୣୡ୲୧୭୬  
Table 7-7: Risk Assessment Value 
Failure Events O S D RPN RAV Priority 
Ranking 
Defective Block Joint 4 9 8 288 5 
Defective Perway Fastenings 2 9 8 144 7 
Defective Rails 5 9 7 315 2 
Derailment 1 10 7 70 8 
Sub-Standard Geometry 3 9 8 216 6 
No Operation 9 6 5 270 1 
Skidmarks 1 10 7 70 8 
Ontrack Welding 2 4 7 56 9 
Calls Perway Personnel 5 6 5 150 3 
Obstructions 5 8 7 280 4 
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7.2 CAUSES OF METRORAIL TRACK UNRELIABILITY 
Even though PRASA has a maintenance plan, the causes of the failures need to be understood 
and eliminated. From the FMEA, the causes of failures of critical components can be attributed 
to; 
 Age degradation due to cumulative tonnage and wear
 Budget constraints to execute planned maintenance
 Inadequate  detection and monitoring systems for the railway track
 Repair and replacement occur on a reactive rather than a proactive basis
 Response time to failure events are slow
Table 7-8 is the cost component of the six critical items that contribute to track unreliability. 
Table 7-8: Direct Cost of Critical Track Components (PRASA, 2013). 
Description Unit Cost [ZAR] 
Turnouts e.a. 920,000 
Single Slips e.a. 2,710,000 
Double Slips e.a. 2,870,000 
Diamonds e.a. 710,000 
Rails km rail 1,500,000 
Sleepers km track 1,200,000 
FMEA can be used to improve the reliability of rail track by identifying the sections of the 
railway track that have the highest (critical) and frequent failures, hence using RPN and RAV to 
prioritize, and determine the appropriate preventive and corrective maintenance. 
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RCM in railway infrastructure objective is to avoid, or to reduce, the consequences of failure, 
through the implementation of a PM strategy geared towards providing optimal system 
availability and safety, at the lowest possible cost. The FMEA conducted highlighted the 
following: 
 Presented the severity of the potential failure modes and provide input into mitigating
measures to reduce risk of the component failures.
 Provides an effective method of identifying criticality of each failure mode and the
impact.
 The FMEA has shown that the failure causes are mainly due to age degradation, lack of
maintenance and inadequate failure detection systems as can be seen in Table 7-6 and
Table 7-7.
7.3 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In concluding this section, it is noted that we have looked at RCM Failure Mode Effects Analysis 
(FMEA) was used to analyze Gauteng South rail track infrastructure. RPN and RAV were used 
to identify areas that require improvement and attention.  FMEA was able to identify points of 
failure and weakness in the maintenance strategy, which can be seen in the outage and response 
time of the component failures (see Table 7-6 and Table 7-7).   
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Railway transport operation is both capital- and labour-intensive; therefore, railway managers are 
continuously looking for new techniques by means of which to improve the reliability of railway 
transport, while providing high-quality service. Their aim is to remain competitive, keeping in 
mind the high cost of transportation, and the inevitably deteriorating infrastructure. In line with 
the objective of this thesis, which has been to research methods of improving rail infrastructure 
reliability, it was found that railway tracks are non-redundant systems with fixed time inspection 
and maintenance intervals. Accordingly, most decisions regarding maintenance are taken without 
considering the age degradation, the utilisation, failure causes and the design life of the rail 
concerned. 
In studying the global failures of rail track, it was found that the industry is experiencing an 
increased number of failures, and it is experiencing similar trends worldwide. Hence, reliability 
improvement techniques were evaluated to find methods that can assist in the improvement of 
the reliability through improved failure management. Such management is aimed at mitigating 
failures through the adoption of improved planning, based on the data that have become 
available on failures. 
8.1 CONCLUSION AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
It can be concluded that the research objectives have been achieved, that of: 
a) A frame work for obtaining improved categorization of the most critical failure modes in
railway track infrastructure has been developed. This was achieved by using RCM-
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FMEA and Pareto analysis.  Understanding and identifying the potential failure modes is 
critical in preventing their re-occurrence. 
b) The collection of rail track failure data and the associated cost of preventive and
corrective maintenance of critical track components. The cause and effect of railway
track unreliability have also been identified.
c) The case study showed that FMEA can be employed to evaluate which RCM strategies
are required; such as a preventive or corrective maintenance activity required, in the light
of its ability to identify the causes, effects and mitigation of rail failure, using historical
failure data.
d) It was found that rail failure is a function of its usage in terms of gross tonnage for
determined conditions. In terms of such thinking, it was then observed that the MTTF and
the MTBF that is traditionally used by many railway operators is not an optimised
concept of measuring reliability, because such measures assume the presence of a
constant failure rate. In reality, however, the failure rate is not constant, because the
failure mechanisms are due to changes in the gross accumulated tonnage, and
geographic-specific problems. As a result, the MTTF and the MTBF are not
recommended for use in terms of the scheduling and planning maintenance intervals of
rail track with dynamic changes in operation and environment.
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8.2 RECOMMENDATIONS AND FURTHER WORK 
8.3 RECOMMENDATIONS 
In continuation of the work that has been done so far in this thesis, the following 
recommendations are made for future research: 
a) The observation of the limited and incomplete/inaccurate database on railway failures
is important, because obtaining improved data would enable the better prevention of
failures, and thus lead to the betterment of maintenance planning, budgeting, and
execution. Consequently, it is recommended that failure reporting be improved.
b) Cluster maintenance strategy of each depot should be applied where the interval of
PM and CM is based on dynamic reliability, which takes into account the age of the
system, the observed rate of service defects, and its utilisation.
c) The maintenance strategy should be dynamic, and it should not be based on either
historical factors, or on the judgement of experienced personnel. This is because of
the changes in rail dynamics in respect of the continuous increase of axle loads,
traffic densities, and speed.
d) Reliability improvement relies on continuous evaluation that is aimed at reducing
instances of failure, and thus at understanding the failure mechanisms of a system
such as rail, which are vital to maintaining its integrity. Therefore, Metrorail should
investigate and research new technologies with regards to rail inspection and real time
condition monitoring that would not affect track availability.
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8.4 FUTURE WORK 
a) The cost–benefits of the preventive and CM should be implemented, so as to measure
the effectiveness of the implemented maintenance strategy.
b) Further research should be conducted into the impact of the interaction of failures, as
it affects the total reliability and availability of the rail track infrastructure.
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APPENDIX A 
SOUTH AFRICAN TRAIN COMMUTER SERVICE 
Gauteng North Commuter Service 
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Gauteng South Commuter Service 
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Western Cape Commuter Service 
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Durban Commuter Service 
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Eastern Cape Commuter Service 
 
Port Elizabeth Commuter Service 
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APPENDIX B 
Turnouts CONDITION (1=Poor, 4=Good)
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 CB/T52 1;12 LH B 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 40 25
 CB/T51 1;12 LH B 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 40 25
 CB/T54 1;12 LH B 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 40 25
 CB/T59 1;12 RH B 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 40 25
 BC/T25 1;12 LH B 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 40 25
 BC/T27 1;12 LH B 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 40 25
 BB/SX4 1;9 RH B 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 40 25
AE/T113 
1;9 RH A 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 3 17 40 43
 AE/T47 1;9 RH A 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 3 17 40 43
 AB/T11 1;9 LH A 2 2 1 3 1 1 1 2 2 3 18 40 45
 AE/T90 1;12 LH A 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 3 18 40 45
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 AE/T94 1;12 LH A 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 3 18 40 45
AE/T115 
1;12 RH A 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 3 18 40 45
 AB/T19 1;9 RH A 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 3 19 40 48
 AB/T7 1;9 LH A 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 19 40 48
 AE/T48 1;9 RH A 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 3 19 40 48
 EB/T15 1;12 LH A 3 3 2 2 1 3 2 2 2 2 22 40 55
 EC/T8 1;9 RH A 2 2 3 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 22 40 55
 DC/T12 1;9 LH A 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 22 40 55
 EA/T28 1;12 RH A 2 3 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 24 40 60
EA/T119 
1;12 RH A 2 3 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 25 40 63
 EA/T30 1;12 LH A 2 3 2 2 2 3 2 3 3 3 25 40 63
 EA/T61 1;9 LH A 3 2 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 25 40 63
 EA/T76 1;12 RH A 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 25 40 63
 EA/T98 1;12 LH A 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 25 40 63
EA/T102 
1;12 RH A 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 25 40 63
EA/T139 
 CC/T16 1;9 LH A 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 25 40 63 
 EB/T7 1;12 RH A 3 3 2 2 2 3 2 3 3 3 26 40 65 
 EB/T9 1;12 LH A 2 3 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 26 40 65 
 EA/T14 1;12 LH A 3 2 2 3 2 3 2 3 3 3 26 40 65 
 EA/T23 1;12 RH A 2 3 3 2 2 3 2 3 3 3 26 40 65 
 EA/T29 1;12 LH A 2 3 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 26 40 65 
 EA/T35 1;12 LH A 2 3 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 26 40 65 
 EA/T47 1;12 LH A 3 3 2 2 2 3 2 3 3 3 26 40 65 
 EA/T50 1;12 RH A 3 3 2 2 2 3 2 3 3 3 26 40 65 
 EA/T87 1;12 RH A 3 3 2 2 2 3 2 3 3 3 26 40 65 
 AF/T1 1;12 LH A 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 27 40 68 
1;12 LH A 3 3 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 27 40 68
 EA/T40 1;12 LH A 2 2 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 27 40 68
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 EA/T92 1;12 RH A 3 3 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 27 40 68
EA/T133 
1;9 RH A 3 2 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 28 40 70
 EA/T4 1;9 LH A 2 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 28 40 70
 EA/T10 1;9 RH A 3 2 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 28 40 70
 EA/T71 1;12 LH A 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 28 40 70
 EA/T91 1;12 LH A 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 28 40 70
EA/T101 
1;9 RH A 3 3 3 3 2 3 2 3 3 3 28 40 70
 AG/T42 1;9 LH B 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 4 28 40 70
 FB/T2 1;9 RH B 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 2 4 28 40 70
 CC/T8 
 DB/T3 
1;9 RH A 4 4 1 1 1 4 4 4 1 4 28 40 70 
1;9 LH A 4 4 1 1 1 4 4 1 4 4 28 40 70
 EA/T21 1;12 LH A 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 29 40 73
EA/T100 
1;9 LH A 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 29 40 73
 AF/T5 1;12 LH A 2 3 3 3 3 4 4 3 3 2 30 40 75
 DC/T27 1;12 RH A 4 4 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 31 40 78
 CD/T20 1;12 RH A 4 4 4 4 4 1 1 4 1 4 31 40 78
 EA/T6 1;12 RH A 3 1 4 4 3 4 4 3 3 3 32 40 80
 FB/T3 1;9 LH B 4 2 4 4 4 4 2 3 2 4 33 40 83
 FA/T14 1;9 RH B 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 3 2 3 34 40 85
 AH/T16 1;9 RH B 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 3 2 3 34 40 85
 AH/T51 1;12 RH B 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 3 2 3 34 40 85
 AB/T35 1;9 RH B 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 34 40 85
 AB/T33 1;12 RH B 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 34 40 85
 DC/T25 1;12 RH A 4 4 4 4 1 4 4 4 1 4 34 40 85
 AG/T59 1;9 LH B 4 2 4 4 4 4 4 3 2 4 35 40 88
 FA/T19 1;9 RH B 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 3 2 4 35 40 88
 FA/T10 1;9 LH B 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 3 2 4 35 40 88
 FA/T13 1;9 RH B 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 3 2 4 35 40 88
 FB/T1 1;9 RH B 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 3 2 4 35 40 88
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 FB/T4 1;9 LH B 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 3 2 4 35 40 88
 AH/T3 1;9 RH B 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 3 2 4 35 40 88
 AH/T5 1;12 RH B 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 3 2 4 35 40 88
 AH/T9 1;12 RH B 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 3 2 4 35 40 88
 AH/T10 1;9 LH B 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 3 2 4 35 40 88
 AH/T17 1;9 RH B 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 3 2 4 35 40 88
 AH/T37 1;12 RH B 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 3 2 4 35 40 88
 AH/T38 1;12 RH B 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 3 2 4 35 40 88
 AH/T39 1;12 RH B 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 3 2 4 35 40 88
 AH/T52 1;12 RH B 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 3 2 4 35 40 88
 FA/T5 1;9 LH B 4 2 4 4 4 4 4 3 2 4 35 40 88
 FA/T6 1;9 RH B 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 2 4 35 40 88
 AD/T13 1;12 LH B 4 4 4 4 1 4 4 4 4 4 37 40 93
 AC/T60 1;12 RH B 4 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 37 40 93
 AC/T55 1;12 LH B 4 4 4 4 1 4 4 4 4 4 37 40 93
 AD/T22 1;9 RH B 4 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 37 40 93
 AD/T23 1;12 LH B 4 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 37 40 93
 AC/T36 1;12 LH B 4 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 37 40 93
 AC/T37 1;12 LH B 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 37 40 93
 AC/T4 1;9 LH B 4 4 4 4 1 4 4 4 4 4 37 40 93
 AC/T55 1;9 LH B 4 4 4 4 1 4 4 4 4 4 37 40 93
 BA/T8 1;9 LH B 4 4 4 4 1 4 4 4 4 4 37 40 93
 BA/T1 1;9 LH B 4 4 4 4 1 4 4 4 4 4 37 40 93
 DC/T51 1;12 RH A 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 1 37 40 93
 DC/T24 1;12 LH A 4 4 4 4 1 4 4 4 4 4 37 40 93
 CC/T15 1;9 LH A 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 37 40 93
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S/Slips CONDITION (1=Poor, 4=Good)
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 EA/SS1 1;7 A 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 56 80 70
 AB/SS1 1;6 B 1 4 4 4 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 65 80 81
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D/Slips CONDITION (1=Poor, 4=Good) 
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 CB/DS9 1;7 B 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 22 88 25 
CB/DS10 
1;7 B 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 22 88 25 
CB/DS11 
1;7 B 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 22 88 25 
 CB/DS7 1;7 B 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 22 88 25 
 CB/DS6 1;7 B 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 22 88 25 
 AB/DS9 1;7 A 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 34 88 39 
 AB/DS2 1;7 A 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 36 88 41 
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 AB/DS1 1;7 A 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 37 88 42 
 AF/DS1 1;7 A 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 44 88 50 
 AF/DS2 1;7 A 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 44 88 50 
 AF/DS3 1;7 A 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 44 88 50 
 CC/DS1 1;7 A 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 1 1 4 1 4 73 88 83 
 CC/DS2 1;7 A 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 85 88 97 
Diamonds CONDITION (1=Poor, 4=Good) 
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 AB/DX2 1;4,5 A 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 23 56 41
 AB/DX4 1;9 A 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 24 56 43
 CB/DX1 1;8 B 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 26 56 46
 AF/DX3 1;7 A 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 38 56 68
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 AF/DX1 1;7 A 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 39 56 70
 AF/DX2 1;7 A 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 39 56 70
 AF/DX5 1;7 A 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 40 56 71
 GA/DX1 1;7 B 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 40 56 71
 EA/DX1 1;7 A 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 42 56 75
 EA/DX2 1;7 A 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 42 56 75
 EA/DX3 1;8 A 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 42 56 75
 AF/DX4 1;7 A 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 42 56 75
 GA/DX2 1;7 B 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 42 56 75
 AG/DX1 1;7 B 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 42 56 75
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 EC/C7 48KG  Limindela 29.780 27.925 62 A 20 4 52 20 13 -54
 EC/C6 48KG  Limindela 27.944 29.785 102 A 14 4 51 14 13 -8
 EC/C8 48KG  Limindela 30.680 29.920 42 A 14 3 21 14 13 -8
 EC/C9 48KG  Limindela 29.910 30.696 42 A 13 2 22 13 13 0
 CB/C13  48KG  Booysens 14.305 14.124 11 B  Skid mark Fatigue 5 0 13 0
 AC/C48  57KG  Roodepoort 33.002 33.242 12 B  Skid mark Fatigue 7 0 18 0
 CB/C15  48KG  Booysens 14.143 14.365 13 B  Skid mark Fatigue 6 0 13 0
 AD/C11  57KG  Westrand 47.588 48.348 14 B  Skid mark Fatigue 21 0 18 0
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 AD/C12  57KG  Robinson 51.599 51.928 19 B  Skid mark Fatigue  9 0 18 0
 AC/C47  57KG  Roodepoort 32.924 33.216 40 B  Skid mark Fatigue  8 0 18 0
 AF/C33 57KG  Driehoek 2.640 2.266 20 A 17 0 10 17 18 6
 EA/C26 48KG  Ravensklip 5.083 5.215 8 A 10 4 4 10 13 23
 AH/C9 48KG  Benoni 15.894 16.352 26 B 10 0 13 10 13 23
 GB/C25 48KG  Elsburg 5.769 6.425 36 B 10 0 18 10 13 23
 AF/C40 57KG  Geldenhuis 3.231 2.958 16 A 13 2 8 13 18 28
 AF/C38 57KG  Geldenhuis 2.882 3.140 20 A 13 1 7 13 18 28
 AF/C39 57KG  Geldenhuis 2.886 3.146 14 A 13 0 7 13 18 28
 AF/C31 57KG  Driehoek 1.858 2.002 20 A 13 0 4 13 18 28
 CD/C1 48KG  Ikwezi 31.883 33.254 77 B 9 4 38 9 13 31
 EA/S50 48KG  Ravensklip 4.881 5.083 12 A 9 3 6 9 13 31
 AE/C38  48KG  Ellispark 12.153 12.622 25 A 8 3 13 8 13 38
 EA/C37 48KG  Elandsfontein 6.439 6.705 16 A 8 2 7 8 13 38
 AF/C9  57KG  Germiston 0.455 0.749 16 A 11 3 8 11 18 39
 AF/C20  57KG  President 1.070 0.951 38 A 10 5 3 10 18 44
 AF/C48 57KG  Geldenhuis 3.675 4.077 22 A 10 4 11 10 18 44
 AF/C80 57KG  Denver 7.975 8.364 22 A 10 4 11 10 18 44
 AF/C81 57KG  Denver 8.962 8.618 18 A 10 4 10 10 18 44
 EA/C36 57KG  Elandsfontein 6.430 6.709 16 A 10 3 8 10 18 44
 AF/C49 57KG  Geldenhuis 4.060 3.797 14 A 9 6 7 9 18 50
 AE/C86  48KG  Johannesburg 13.897 14.035 7 A 6 4 4 6 13 54
 EA/C116 57KG  Birchleigh 21.795 22.389 32 A 8 3 16 8 18 56
 AB/C20 57 KG  Mayfair 17.160 17.102 3 A 8 2 2 8 18 56
 AB/C43  57KG  Crosvenor 18.356 18.677 16 A 7 3 9 7 18 61
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Sleepers
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 CB/S97  Timber  Riverlea 20.931 20.179 1074 B 1 1 2 8 25
 CB/C75  Timber  Riverlea 21.019 20.931 126 B 1 1 2 8 25
 CB/A38  Timber  Riverlea 21.025 21.019 8 B 1 1 2 8 25
 CB/C77  Timber  Riverlea 21.110 21.025 121 B 1 1 2 8 25
 CB/S108  Timber  Riverlea 22.110 21.110 1429 B 1 1 2 8 25
 CB/S112  Timber  Riverlea 22.831 22.110 1030 B 1 1 2 8 25
 CB/C79  Timber  Riverlea 23.105 22.831 391 B 1 1 2 8 25
 CB/S114  Timber  Riverlea 23.350 23.105 350 B 1 1 2 8 25
 DC/CS7  Timber  Lenz 43.299 43.397 140 A 1 1 2 8 25
 DC/C56  Timber  Residensia 70.626 69.873 1076 A 1 1 2 8 25
 DC/S109  Timber  Eatonside 70.637 71.402 1093 A 1 1 2 8 25
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DC/C110 
 Timber  Eatonside 71.421 70.626 1136 A 1 1 2 8 25
 DC/C58  Timber  Eatonside 71.402 71.617 307 A 1 1 2 8 25
 DC/C59  Timber  Eatonside 71.607 71.421 266 A 1 1 2 8 25
 DC/S111  Timber  Eatonside 71.617 72.068 644 A 1 1 2 8 25
 DC/S112  Timber  Eatonside 72.060 71.607 647 A 1 1 2 8 25
 DC/C60  Timber  Eatonside 72.068 72.720 931 A 1 1 2 8 25
 DC/C61  Timber  Eatonside 72.706 72.060 923 A 1 1 2 8 25
 DC/S119  Timber  Kwaggastroom 75.332 76.332 1428 A 1 1 2 8 25
 DC/S121  Timber  Kwaggastroom 76.332 76.820 697 A 1 1 2 8 25
 AC/S100  Concert  Lanwen 43.306 43.591 408 B 1 1 2 8 25
 AC/C83  Concert  Lanwen 43.192 43.192 163 B 1 1 2 8 25
 AC/A44  Concert  Lanwen 43.186 43.192 9 B 1 1 2 8 25
 AC/C81  Concert  Lanwen 43.186 43.096 129 B 1 1 2 8 25
 AD/S20  Timber  Millsite 50.360 51.360 1429 B 2 2 4 8 50
 AD/S19  Timber  Millsite 49.348 50.348 1429 B 2 2 4 8 50
 AD/S22  Timber  Millsite 51.360 51.599 342 B 2 2 4 8 50
 AD/S21  Timber  Millsite 50.348 51.348 1429 B 2 2 4 8 50
 AD/C12  Timber  Millsite 51.928 51.928 470 B 2 2 4 8 50
 AD/S23  Timber  Millsite 51.348 51.593 350 B 2 2 4 8 50
AD/C13  Timber  Millsite 51.593 51.910 453 B 2 2 4 8 50
 AJ/S1  Timber  Springs 33.272 33.482 475 B 3 3 6 8 75
 AH/A37  Timber  Springs 33.671 33.680 30 B 3 3 6 8 75
 AH/C35  Timber  Springs 33.671 33.735 125 B 3 3 6 8 75
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 AH/C36  Timber  Springs 33.724 33.857 95 B 3 3 6 8 75
 AH/S39  Timber  Apex 19.276 19.522 150 B 3 3 6 8 75
 AH/S40  Timber  Apex 19.302 19.557 104 B 3 3 6 8 75
 AH/S4  Timber  Dunswart 12.331 12.355 65 B 3 3 6 8 75
 AH/S8  Timber  Dunswart 12.474 12.519 65 B 3 3 6 8 75
 AH/S10  Timber  Dunswart 12.527 12.599 130 B 3 3 6 8 75
 AH/A3  Timber  Dunswart 12.561 12.574 62 B 3 3 6 8 75
 AG/A27  Timber  Boksburg-oos 9.679 9.691 40 B 3 3 6 8 75
 AG/A25  Timber  Boksburg-oos 9.619 9.652 20 B 3 3 6 8 75
 AG/S73  Timber  Boksburg-oos 10.590 10.644 40 B 3 3 6 8 75
 AG/A31  Timber  Boksburg-oos 10.665 10.696 50 B 3 3 6 8 75
 EA/S81  Timber  Elandsfontein 7.416 7.506 129 A 3 3 6 8 75
 EA/C49  Timber  Elandsfontein 7.361 7.506 207 A 3 3 6 8 75
 EA/C48  Timber  Elandsfontein 7.315 7.430 164 A 3 3 6 8 75
 EA/S80  Timber  Elandsfontein 7.317 7.340 161 A 3 3 6 8 75
 EA/C44  Timber  Elandsfontein 7.219 7.297 111 A 3 3 6 8 75
 EA/C45  Timber  Elandsfontein 7.229 7.317 126 A 3 3 6 8 75
 EA/S75  Timber  Elandsfontein 7.029 7.229 286 A 3 3 6 8 75
 EA/S70  Timber  Elandsfontein 6.805 6.826 30 A 3 3 6 8 75
 AF/S80  Timber  George Goch 8.364 8.620 366 A 3 3 6 8 75
 AF/A6  Timber  Germiston 0.316 0.356 57 A 3 3 6 8 75
 AF/A21  Timber  President 1.601 1.642 58 A 3 3 6 8 75
 AF/A23  Timber  President 1.674 1.717 61 A 3 3 6 8 75
 AF/A28  Timber  Driehoek 1.835 1.800 50 A 3 3 6 8 75
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 AF/A39  Timber  Geldenhuis 5.008 4.968 57 A 3 3 6 8 75
 AF/S61  Timber  Cleveland 4.972 5.010 54 A 3 3 6 8 75
 AF/A50  Timber  Cleveland 5.765 5.806 58 A 3 3 6 8 75
 AF/A48  Timber  Cleveland 5.785 5.798 18 A 3 3 6 8 75
 EA/S25  Timber  Germiston 0.619 0.655 51 A 3 3 6 8 75
 EA/A15  Timber  Germiston 0.639 0.645 8 A 3 3 6 8 75
 EA/A17  Timber  Germiston 0.666 0.701 50 A 3 3 6 8 75
PRASA Reliability Methodology Example 
PERWAY RELIABILITY(MTBF) (hours)  2013/14 - YTD 
Target  35.1 
National 95.1 
Gauteng  32.2 
Durban 408.0 
Cape Town 32.0 
PERWAY AVAILIBILITY (%) MTBF/(MTBF+MTTR) 2013/14 - YTD 
Target  95.9 
National 96.2 
Gauteng  92.7 
Durban 98.8 
Cape Town 85.5 
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